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ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: A
LOOK AT THE STATE CIVIL PENALTY
STATUTES
Daniel P. Selmi *
I. INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of environmental law has been controversial since the
massive increase in environmental regulation began in 1969.1 During the
early 1970's, disputes centered on issues such as whether technological
infeasibility provides a defense to enforcement actions and on the pros-
pect that environmental regulation would result in draconian industrial
shutdowns.2 By the early 1980's the debate had shifted dramatically; its
focus became the lack of enforcement initiative at the federal level.3 Re-
cently, public concern over the improper disposal of hazardous wastes
has brought a new emphasis on criminal prosecutions as an enforcement
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. B.A. 1972,
J.D. 1975, University of Santa Clara; M.P.A. 1981, Harvard University. Professor Selmi is a
former Deputy Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Sections, Office of the
California Attorney General (1976-83), and former Chair, California State Bar Committee on
the Environment (1984-85).
The author expresses his appreciation to Elissa A. Parker, Esq. and David Nawi, Esq.,
who commented on an earlier draft of this Article. Opinions expressed in the Article are, of
course, those of the author only. The author also would like to thank Christie L. Morehead,
Loyola Law School '86, for her invaluable contribution to researching this Article, and Hilda
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1. The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982)), was the first step in
what became a flood of environmental legislation in the 1970's. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
ITY: THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY iii
(1980) (transmittal message from the President noting that during the decade from 1970 to
1980, "Congress has passed more than two dozen pieces of landmark legislation designed to
preserve or enhance environmental quality .... ").
2. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 593 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1979) (discussing when the
issue of economic and technological feasibility of air pollution controls could be raised under
the Clean Air Act); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977) (same).
3. See J. LASH, K. GILLMAN & D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984). Responding
to a barrage of congressional and public criticism, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency launched a highly publicized effort to increase that agency's enforcement
efforts. See, e.g., Memo of the Month, ENVTL. FORUM, May 1984, at 48 (reproducing a memo-
randum from the EPA Deputy Administrator to EPA Regional Administrators stating that
the level of enforcement activity under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was
insufficient and calling for increased enforcement of that Act).
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tool for hazardous waste violations.4
A significant feature of the environmental enforcement framework is
its federal nature. Federal legislation largely has set the policy parame-
ters of environmental law,' but this legislation envisions that the princi-
pal enforcement efforts will take place at the state level. The typical
model of federal environmental law delegates implementation and en-
forcement of regulatory efforts to states, with the federal government re-
taining oversight enforcement authority.6
Both politics and pragmaticism dictated this congressional choice.
Complete federalization of environmental enforcement would radically
centralize power traditionally exercised by the states, a politically unac-
ceptable outcome. Further, increased federal enforcement would require
a much larger federal bureaucracy. Budgetary considerations alone have
precluded this development in the past, and the federal deficit undoubt-
edly will increase dependence on state enforcement in the future.7
State agencies enforcing environmental laws have a panoply of legal
remedies available to them, including cease and desist orders,8 injunc-
4. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE:
DIFFICULT TO DETECT OR DETER 38-41 (1985) (discussing criminal prosecutions for hazard-
ous waste violations). The 1984 Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-616, tit. I, § 101a, 98 Stat.
3224 (1984), responded to the rising public concern over hazardous waste disposal.
5. See, eg., Clean Air Act (CAA) § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982) (state implementation
plan provisions requiring states to prepare a plan for federal approval that will meet federal
ambient air quality standards).
6. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 321 (1984) ("The states have the first opportunity and primary responsibil-
ity [for enforcing air pollution law and] are continuously involved in scores of environmental
actions, creating an important subfield of environmental law.") Id. See also Clean Water Act
(CWA) § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1982) (authorizing Administrator of EPA to bring
suit if, after he has notified the state of a violation, the state has not commenced appropriate
enforcement action within thirty days).
7. The budget pinch caused by the federal deficit also may increase reliance on other
enforcement methods. For example, a recent article quoted EPA lawyers as stating that budg-
etary curbs affecting agency enforcement efforts under the so-called "Gramm-Rudman"
mandatory spending reduction law may prompt them "to take a more favorable view of citizen
suits," i.e., suits brought by private individuals or groups to enforce environmental laws. The
article suggests that because of EPA budget cuts, the agency may be more willing to share
information with environmentalists who bring enforcement actions. Effron, U.S. Agencies Feel
Gramm-Rudman Pinch, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 17, 1986, at 3, col. 1, at 10, col. 1. For a discussion of
citizen suits, see Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking up the Pace, 9 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REV. 23 (1985); Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, 13 ENVTL.
L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,309 (1983); Barr & Hernandez, When Citizens Sue: Some Feder-
alism Issues, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1341 (1986).
8. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-C:9 (1985) (emergency order); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-24-14(4) (1953 & Supp. 1984).
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tions,9 damages 0 and criminal penalties. 1 However, an important tool
is the power to assess or request that a court assess civil penalties against
polluters. Civil penalties are monetary fines that are generally intended
to deter violations of environmental standards rather than to punish.
12
The nature of environmental law violations dictates the important
role that penalties play in enforcement. Injunctive relief and cease and
desist orders require enforcement officials to discover the violation prior
to or during its occurrence, while in many instances those officials learn
of violations after the fact. 3 At that point an injunction or cease and
desist order cannot remedy prior harm. Furthermore, because injunc-
tions merely order violators to cease illegal actions, they provide no in-
centive that deters different violations in the future. While some factual
patterns are amenable to criminal prosecution, the burden of proof and
difficulty of obtaining convictions for environmental crimes limit the role
of prosecutions. Lastly, regulatory agencies traditionally have used civil
monetary penalties as an important enforcement tool, 4 and environmen-
9. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42453 (West 1979).
10. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 445.331(2) (1979).
11. See I F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.04, at 3-384 to 3-386 (1985)
(listing maximum and minimum state criminal penalties for water pollution violations); Cur-
re, State Pollution Statutes, 48 U. CH. L. REV. 27, 62-69 (1981) (discussing state enforcement
tools generally).
12. See ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, STUDY OF LITERATURE CONCERNING THE
ROLES OF PENALTIES IN REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT 4 (Sept. 1985). "Penalties assessed by
regulatory agencies tend to be, in most cases, remedial rather than punitive in nature. Their
primary purposes are to bring the violator back into compliance and to deter him from further
noncompliance." Id. The study also notes that while regulatory agencies can punish violators
through civil penalties, "[r]egulatory agencies have generally used sanctions for remedial pur-
poses, not for punishment." Id.
13. See Comment, The Use of Civil Penalties In Enforcing the Clean Water Act Amend-
ments of 1977, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 437, 446 (1978) (noting that civil penalties avoid the "all or
nothing solution, so often associated with injunctions"). See also Mix, The Misdemeanor Ap-
proach to Pollution Control, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 90, 92 (1968) (observing that the air pollution
control district in Los Angeles at that time had found injunctive remedy "to be of very limited
value").
14. A variety of articles have discussed the use of civil monetary penalties by federal agen-
cies. See, e.g., Bickart, Civil Penalties Under Section 5(m) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1977); Murphy, Money Penalties-An Administrative Sword of
Damocles, 2 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 113 (1962); Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role
of Penalties in the Enforcement of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 1
(1978); Schmeltzer & Kitzes, Administrative Civil Penalties Are Here to Stay-But How Should
They Be Implemented?, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 847 (1977) (discussing civil penalties under the
Consumer Product Safety Act). For more general discussions, see Gellhorn, Administrative
Prescription and Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 265; Goldschmid, Report in Sup-
port of Recommendation 72-6: An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money
Penalties As a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 896 (1972).
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tal enforcement agencies formed or reorganized in the late 1960's and
early 1970's have drawn on the earlier experiences of agencies using civil
penalties.
This Article analyzes state statutes that authorize enforcement of
environmental laws through the imposition of civil penalties, emphasiz-
ing hazardous waste, air pollution, water pollution, pesticide and similar
state pollution statutes. I" The purpose of the Article is to offer insights
into state enforcement efforts by examining the enforcement standards
and procedures found in those statutes. Of course the statutory provi-
sions tell only part of the enforcement picture; definitive conclusions
about the efficacy of state enforcement efforts depend on analysis of a
number of additional factors. For example, the state agency's bureau-
cratic structure would have to be analyzed, as well as the agency's settle-
ment policies and practices. Nonetheless, consideration of the statutory
framework is a necessary beginning point. The statutes arm the agencies
with enforcement powers, declare the monetary fines that may be as-
sessed, indicate the circumstances under which a penalty may be sought,
and establish the procedures that a state court or state agency must fol-
low in deciding whether a penalty is warranted. In short, the statutes
erect a structure that both orders and constrains the penalty process.' 6
The significant characteristics of state civil penalty provisions are
examined below in three parts. First, the penalty amounts authorized
and the criteria for imposing the penalty are analyzed. This discussion
reveals the breadth of the authority that agencies exercise and empha-
sizes methods such as rulemaking or policymaking that they could adopt
15. State occupational safety and health legislation was not considered. Additionally, this
Article does not address state legislation implementing the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982). State legislation under SMCRA,
which is adminstered by the Department of Interior, is required to track the federal statute
closely and thus yields less insight into the overall development of state penalty procedures.
See SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253; ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PRACTICES OF SE-
LECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES' OVERSIGHT OF STATE CIVIL PENALTIES 1 (1985). "The sur-
face mining law . . . includes factors which delegated states must consider in assessing
penalties. No EPA-administered statutes include this type of direction on state assessment of
penalties."
16. The most comprehensive compilation to date of state civil penalty statutes is found in
ENVTL. L. INST., STATE CIVIL PENALTY AUTHORITIES AND POLICIES, A REPORT PRE-
PARED FOR THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Sept. 27, 1985) [hereinafter
cited as STATE CIVIL PENALTY AUTHORITIES], which was completed while this Article was in
preparation and which contains some commentary on the laws. See also AMERICAN INS.
ASS'N, SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION LEGISLATION & REGULATION: HAZARD-
OUS SUBSTANCES (1984). For a general analysis of state statutes in the environmental area, see
Currie, supra note 11. The same author also has written on enforcement of Illinois environ-
mental law. Currie, Enforcement Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 389
(1975).
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to guide their discretion. Second, the Article explores assessment proce-
dures that agencies use in imposing penalties, concluding that statutes
should provide more direction to agencies and require them to explain
the reasons for their penalty decisions. The Article then focuses on stat-
utes establishing standards for judicial control of the penalty process,
both when the court imposes penalties and when the court reviews an
administratively assessed penalty. The discussion notes that if the
agency has assessed the penalty, the courts often defer to that decision on
judicial review, a result that enhances the agencies' enforcement powers.
Finally, the Article sets forth several observations on the manner in
which this statutory framework affects state agency enforcement efforts.
It concludes that agency assessment rather than penalty imposition
through courts is likely to improve the penalty process.
In this discussion, federal environmental law is relevant to set the
context for state enforcement efforts. Because that body of law has
greatly influenced the content of state penalty statutes, it must be ex-
amined briefly.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. The Federal Regulatory Model
The purposes of environmental law and how those purposes are
translated into enforceable environmental restrictions largely explain the
need for civil penalty authority. From an economic standpoint, the pur-
pose of environmental regulation is to internalize costs that otherwise
would be imposed on society as a whole, 7 a result that theoretically
could be accomplished through emission fees, marketable permits, taxes
or other methods.18 However, in addressing environmental problems
Congress has markedly preferred what has been termed "command and
control" regulation.19 Under this type of regulation, statutes command
polluters to reduce emissions to certain administratively or legislatively
prescribed levels and to take other steps, such as monitoring emissions.2"
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgates
17. Marshall, Environmental Protection and the Role of the Civil Money Penalty: Some
Practical and Legal Considerations, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 323, 324-27 (1975).
18. See Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Frame-
work, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1264 (1981).
19. Id. at 1264-65. See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d
Cir. 1985) (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act "is
not a regulatory standard-setting statute such as the Clean Air Act").
20. See CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982) (calling for pollution reduction to level
achieved by "best practicable control technology currently available" and "best available con-
trol technology economically achievable").
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performance standards that new stationary sources of air pollution must
meet under the Clean Air Act,21 sets effluent limitations for sources
under the Clean Water Act,22 and establishes performance standards for
hazardous waste facilities. z3 While the "command and control" method
is increasingly criticized as economically inefficient, 24 it remains the prev-
alent congressional choice in almost every area of environmental law.25
Despite this emphasis on federally mandated control efforts, Con-
gress has continued to rely on the states to achieve federal goals and to
administer the regulatory permit programs.2 6 Generally, federal legisla-
tion authorizes state administration of federal standards if the state can
establish a program meeting certain minimum requirements. 27 The Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)2 is typical. Under that
Act, EPA issues guidelines to assist states in developing their hazardous
waste regulatory programs; states then may submit a hazardous waste
program to the Administrator of EPA for approval. After receiving that
authorization, the state administers the permit program for storage,
treatment and disposal of hazardous waste.29
To receive approval under most major federal environmental laws, a
state program must include the capacity to undertake specific enforce-
ment measures. For example, under EPA regulations implementing the
Clean Water Act,3" a state seeking authority to administer a program
21. CAA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982).
22. CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982).
23. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982).
24. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333,
1334-40 (1985); Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1985).
25. For an article critical of the arguments that environmental regulation must be
changed, see Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Stan-
dards and "Fine-Tuning"Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1985), contend-
ing that "[d]espite its imperfections, command-and-control regulation has fostered significant
improvements in environmental quality at a societal cost that has not proved prohibitive."
26. See, e.g., F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
§ 3.07, at 89-90 (1981):
The Congressional method of achieving and maintaining national standards for pol-
lutants always focused on the states. The 1970 Amendments [to the Clean Air Act]
continued the process introduced in the 1967 Air Quality Control Act. The process,
which has been followed in subsequent environmental programs, uses federal stan-
dards and regulations that are carried out and enforced through state plans and
programs.
27. CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982); RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b)
(1982); CAA § 111(c)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)-(d) (1982).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
29. RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1982).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 123.27 (1985). Part 123 contains the complete requirements for state pro-
grams under the Clean Water Act. Id.
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must demonstrate that its program includes civil penalties assessable "in
at least the amount of $5,000 a day for each violation."31 Upon ap-
proval, the state becomes the primary enforcement authority, although
EPA retains the power to bring actions against polluters for civil penal-
ties or other relief. 2
This model of federal environmental law strongly influences the
state civil penalty statutes. States generally are eager to receive EPA ap-
proval to administer their own hazardous waste, air and water programs.
To meet the EPA requirement of adequate enforcement authority, states
often enact enforcement provisions similar to those in the federal acts.
Little incentive exists for states to implement creative enforcement mech-
anisms if those measures would jeopardize EPA authorization of state
programs.
At the same time, the federally imposed enforcement requirements
leave a fair amount of discretion to the states in constructing their own
civil penalty programs. For example, states may specify the criteria for
assessment of a penalty, an important factor in any penalty program.33
Also, states usually may decide whether the court or the agency imposes
the penalty, arguably the most important choice affecting the success of a
civil penalty enforcement program.34
B. Characteristics of the Federal Penalty Statutes
Two characteristics of the federal civil penalty statutes are particu-
larly important in their effect on state statutes. First, the dollar amounts
that the statutes authorize for penalties are high in comparison with non-
environmental federal civil penalty provisions. A 1979 study of the 348
31. Id. § 123.27(a)(3)(i). Other remedies that must be available include: (1) the power to
restrain a person by order or lawsuit from engaging in an unauthorized activity "which is
endangering or causing damage to public health or the environment," id. § 123.27(a)(1); and
(2) criminal fines "assessable in at least the amount of $10,000 a day for each violation." Id.
§ 123.27(a)(3)(ii). The maximum civil or criminal fine must be assessable for each instance of
violation and, if the violation is continuous, for each day of violation. Id. § 123.27(b)(1).
32. See, eg., CWA § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982). See also ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT "AGREEMENTS" 1 (1984).
EPA notes that "[w]hile States and local governments have primary responsibility for compli-
ance and enforcement actions within delegated or approved States, EPA retains responsibility
for ensuring fair and effective enforcement of federal requirements, and a credible national
deterrence to non-compliance." Id. The document sets forth the EPA "policy framework for
implementing an effective State/Federal enforcement relationship through national program
guidance and Regional/State 'agreements.'" Id. The policy framework was being revised at
the time this Article was written.
33. But see infra note 125 discussing EPA's requirement that fault not be a factor in estab-
lishing the statutory violation.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 172-76.
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federal civil penalty statutes then extant found that only thirty-five set
dollar limits of $10,000 or more per violation, while twelve imposed lim-
its of $25,000 or more."5 Nine of these twelve statutes were environmen-
tal in nature, and two of the nine were included in federal legislation
permitting states to apply for enforcement authority. 6 To the extent
that penalty amounts indicate the priority Congress attaches to regula-
tory mandates, environmental requirements are important.
The second significant characteristic of the federal environmental
statutes is their lack of specificity concerning when a penalty is appropri-
ate and how to calculate the amount of a penalty. The federal statutes
contain few constraints or standards circumscribing penalty decisions by
a court or an agency. The Clean Air Act, for example, declares merely
that any person who violates certain provisions regulating new motor
vehicles "shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000,"
with each violation for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine constitut-
ing a separate offense.37 The statute gives no further indications to guide
the authority imposing the penalty. Other environmental statutes are not
quite as broad, setting forth some factors that the Administrator of EPA
or the court must consider in assessing any penalty.38 Nonetheless, de-
35. Diver, Report in Support of Recommendation 79-3: The Assessment and Mitigation of
Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administrative Agencies, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND RE-
PORTS OF THE ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. 203, at 214 (1979).
36. Id. The nine environmental statutes were: (1) 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1976) (unauthor-
ized manufacture or distribution of toxic substances: $25,000); (2) 16 U.S.C. § 971e(c) (1976)
(illegal importation of protected species of fish: $100,000); (3) 16 U.S.C. § 971e(A) (1976)
(catching or transporting such fish: $50,000 for second offense); (4) 16 U.S.C. § 1376(b) (1976)
(taking protected marine mammals: $25,000); (5) 16 U.S.C. § 1433 (1976) (violation of marine
sanctuaries regulation: $50,000); (6) 16 U.S.C. § 1858 (1976) (violation of fishery management
plan: $25,000); (7) 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (1976) (ocean dumping: $50,000); (8) 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928 (1976) (improper disposal of hazardous wastes: $25,000); and (9) 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)
(Supp. 1977) (stationary source air pollution violations: $25,000). Diver, supra note 35, at 214
n.59.
The latter two of these statutes are federal legislation authorizing states to seek EPA
approval for their enforcement programs. Diver, supra note 35, at 214 n.59. Of the important
federal statutes that EPA administers in the fields of hazardous waste, air and water pollution
and pesticides, the lowest penalty is $500 per day for the first violation of the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. FIFRA § 14(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(2) (1982). Sub-
sequent offenses may be penalized not more than $1000 for each offense. Id.
37. CAA § 205, 42 U.S.C. § 7524 (1982). Similarly, the Noise Control Act specifies that
any person who violates specified paragraphs is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000
per day of violation, with each day of violation constituting a separate violation. Noise Con-
trol Act § 1 l(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4910(a)(2) (1982).
38. See, eg., Toxic Subtances Control Act (TSCA) § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1982)
(stating that the Administrator shall assess a civil penalty taking into account the nature,
circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation or violations; ability of the violator to pay;
effect on his or her ability to do business; history of prior violations; degree of culpability; and
other factors "as justice may require"). The Clean Air Act stationary source provisions re-
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spite the fact that the penalty amounts authorized may have important
economic ramifications, on the whole the federal environmental statutes
do not contain extensive criteria governing penalty assessment.39
Both of these factors-the size of the penalties authorized and the
discretion accorded the court or agency imposing the penalty-
strengthen the position of the agency enforcing the regulatory scheme.
When a penalty accrues at a rate of $5000 to $25,000 per violation, with
each day that the violator transgresses the regulatory standard deemed a
separate violation, the possible penalty can rapidly multiply if the viola-
tion is not quickly discovered or promptly corrected. At the same time,
if the agency assesses the penalty, the statute vesting discretion in the
agency places few constraints on the exercise of its penalty powers. Un-
less the agency itself attempts to structure its discretion through adopted
policies,4' it will have wide latitude in deciding when to seek penalties
and what penalty amount is appropriate.
If a state seeking EPA certification of its enforcement program
adopts a penalty statute modeled after federal penalty provisions, the
state statute will import these characteristics. Accordingly, we would
expect many state penalty statutes to set large dollar amounts per day of
violation, and to contain relatively few criteria for determining when a
penalty is warranted and what that penalty should be in a given case.
III. STATE PENALTY AMOUNTS AND STATUTORY
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
A. Penalty Amounts
The logical beginning points for examining state civil penalty stat-
quire the court to consider the size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty on the
business and the seriousness of the violation. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1982).
39. See Diver, supra note 35, at 214 (noting that Congress on the whole "has imposed few
constraints on the discretion of the penalty-imposing authority to determine the amount of the
penalty within the stated limits").
40. EPA has formulated extensive civil penalty policies. In 1984, the Agency announced
the adoption of an Agency-wide civil penalty policy in two documents: (1) Policy on Civil
Penalties, dated Feb. 16, 1984, which is intended to set forth the agency's general penalty
philosophy; and (2) A Frameworkfor Statute-Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessments, dated
Feb. 16, 1984, which is intended to provide guidance to specific programs on how to develop
medium-specific penalty policies. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON CIVIL PENAL-
TIES, No. GM-21 (1984) [hereinafter cited as POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES]; ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO PENALTY
ASSESSMENTS: IMPLEMENTING EPA's POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, No. GM-21 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO PENALTY As-
SESSMENTS]. These documents have been followed by a series of penalty policies for specific
regulatory programs.
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utes are the maximum and minimum amounts authorized as well as the
criteria for determining the amount of a penalty in a particular case.
These figures establish the boundaries of administrative or judicial discre-
tion in fixing a penalty.
1. Statutory maximum and minimum penalties
The typical state statute authorizing civil penalties is a "variable
penalty" statute establishing the outer limits of the penalty range, with
penalties accruing either on a "per day" or "per violation" basis. The
penalty amount actually imposed in a given situation may bear little rela-
tion to these limits set by the legislature. Nonetheless, the statutory lim-
its are significant because they provide at least some indication of the
legislative importance attached to the environmental violation and be-
cause they determine the outside liability in specific situations.41
Hazardous waste violations stand at the top of the penalty hierar-
chy. The state civil penalty statutes indicate a high level of legislative
concern over hazardous waste handling and disposal, with the majority
of statutes authorizing a penalty of up to $25,000 per day of violation.42
The Michigan Hazardous Waste Management Act is typical. The Act
authorizes penalties for violations of a statutory provision or a rule
promulgated under it, stating that the court "may impose a civil fine of
not more than $25,000 for each instance of violation, and, if the violation
is continuous, for each day of continued noncompliance.""a A few states
place even more emphasis on this area. New Hampshire has set an
outside limit of $50,000 per violation,' while Florida likewise has
adopted a $50,000 per day limit, with that state's Resource Recovery and
Management Act making a violator liable for certain additional damages
as well. a"
41. See Lawrence, Judicial Review of Variable Civil Money Penalties, 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
373, 407 (1977) (noting that increasing money penalties for more serious violations places
higher premiums on what society wants controlled).
42. The recent Environmental Law Institute study concluded that "[t]he majority of state
hazardous waste programs have authority to levy penalties as large as the largest federal maxi-
mum under RCRA." STATE CIVIL PENALTY AUTHORITIES, supra note 16, at 8.
43. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.548(1) (West 1984). The Michigan Act allows the attorney
general "or a person" to bring an action, thus apparently authorizing a civil penalty action to
be brought as a citizen suit. Other penalty provisions in the hazardous waste area include:
ALA. CODE § 22-30-19(d) (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-4213(b) (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 6309 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-140 (Law. Co-op. 1985); W. VA. CODE
§ 20-5E-16 (1985); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.74(2) (West Supp. 1985). All of these statutes
establish a penalty limit of at least $25,000 per day.
44. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-A:17 (Supp. 1985).
45. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.727(3)(a) (West Supp. 1986).
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Other violations of state pollution laws typically call for penalties
that are substantial but smaller than the penalties for hazardous waste
violations. Water pollution variable penalties often have outside limits of
$10,000 per violation or per day,4 6 although some are as high as $25,000
per day.4 7 State drinking water legislation falls into much the same cate-
gory.48 Strikingly, pesticides apparently reflect even less legislative con-
cern,49 a fact that must be attributed more to industry lobbying power
than to impartial analysis of environmental harm.
If a state legislature is concerned that a penalty accruing on a per
day or per violation basis may become excessive, establishing an upper
cap on the penalty is a possibility, although a little used one. A Mary-
land law regulating hazardous waste allows the imposition of a penalty of
up to $1000 for each violation "but not exceeding $50,000 total."50 Simi-
larly, a Nevada statute governing hazardous waste disposal areas subjects
violators to "[p]enalties of no more than $3,000 per day for each separate
failure to comply with a license or agreement or $25,000 for any 30-day
period for all failures to comply."51
While most statutes merely prescribe an upper limit to the daily or
"per violation" penalty amount, some impose a lower limit as well. Pre-
sumably, setting a minimum indicates a legislative intent that the viola-
tion always deserves at least some civil sanction, an amount that can be
substantial. For example, Washington legislation establishes $1000 as
the minimum penalty for certain water pollution violations, an amount
sufficient to secure the attention of any regulated entity.52 Perhaps the
most interesting statute of this type is a Wisconsin law directed toward
reducing sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants. A utility violating
46. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-52(a) (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d(a) (1985);
W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-17 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.21(2) (West 1974).
47. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.150(1) (Supp. 1986).
48. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-171s (1985) (prescribing penalties for violation of drinking
water standards and conditions of operating a public water supply system).
49. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-28(a) (1985) ($5000 for each offense); TEX. AGRIC.
CODE ANN. § 76.156(a) (Vernon 1982) ($50 to $1000 per day); W. VA. CODE § 19-16B-22(c)
(1984) (commissioner may assess penalty for violation of the Pesticide Use and Application
Act not to exceed $200 upon a person other than private applicator).
50. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE § 7-266(b)(2)(i) (Supp. 1985). A Puerto Rico water pol-
lution statute also sets a maximum of $50,000 "for violations of this chapter." P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 12, § 1518(a) (1978).
51. NEv. REV. STAT. § 444.744 (1981).
52. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.150(1) (Supp. 1986). See also KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 350.990(2) (Bobbs-Merrill 1983). Under that legislation, any person who engages in surface
coal mining operations without first securing a permit "shall be liable to [sic] a civil penalty for
damages to the Commonwealth of not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000)." Id.
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the law's prohibitions "shall forfeit not less than $25,000 nor more than
$50,000" for each violation. 3
In the usual case, however, the disparity between the upper cap and
the lower limit is so large that the minimum amount does not practically
constrain the agency's discretion in seeking penalties or make a signifi-
cant statement about the legislature's concern. The Alabama Water Pol-
lution Control Act exemplifies this tendency, declaring that violators
shall be liable for a penalty of "not less than $100.00 nor more than
$10,000.00" for the violation. 4 Furthermore, if the statutory scheme ex-
pressly authorizes the agency to mitigate penalties,"5 or if the agency as-
sumes that it has this power, the minimum loses almost all significance.
In addition to placing a cap on the total penalty or requiring a pen-
alty minimum, a variety of other techniques exist to structure the penalty
amount that a court or agency can impose. Commonly a statute will
establish an initial penalty for an event and then alter the penalty for
continued violations. A Georgia statute sets an initial maximum of
$1000 for a violation of an emergency order and then authorizes an addi-
tional civil penalty not to exceed $500 for each day that the violation
continues. 6 New York's penalty statute for petroleum and other liquid
spills places a $2500 liability limit on defined responsible persons for an
initial incident; it then permits an additional penalty not to exceed $500
for each day the "contravention or contribution thereto continues.
' '57
Another method of defining the penalty structure is to establish a
penalty for the initial violation but make further penalties contingent on
a specific administrative event. The event could be the receipt of an or-
der 8 or of written notification from the enforcing agency. 9
53. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.385(8) (West Supp. 1985).
54. ALA. CODE § 22-22-9(o) (Supp. 1981). See also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-
2103(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (any person violating variety of provisions "shall be liable for
a penalty not less than two hundred fifty dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars for said
violation and an additional penalty of not to exceed five hundred dollars for each day during
which such violation continues"). Of course, if the upper limit on the variable penalty is not
large, the lower limit becomes more of a limiting factor on the agency's discretion. See, e.g.,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-170(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985) (allowing South Carolina Coastal
Council to assess civil penalty of $100 to $1000 per day of violation).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 142-48.
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-41(a) (Supp. 1982).
57. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-1941(1) (McKinney 1984). The penalty can be
imposed only for spills of polluting liquids that are stored in amounts over 1100 gallons. Id.
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:13A-12b (West Supp. 1985) (establishing penalties of not more
than $500 for a first offense; not less than $100 nor more than $1000 for a second offense; and
not less than $500 nor more than $1000 for a third and every subsequent solid waste offense).
58. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10d (West Supp. 1985). The New Jersey Commis-
sioner of Environmental Protection is authorized to assess a civil penalty of not more than
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Finally, the penalty statutes may address the situation where a com-
pany or individual follows earlier violations with additional transgres-
sions. The statutes often disapprove of this conduct by mandating an
increase in the penalty amount for the subsequent violations. One possi-
bility is to increase the penalty by a fixed amount or percentage if the
violation is repeated within a specified time frame. A Wisconsin pesti-
cide statute is quite specific; a violator is to forfeit between $100 and $500
for the first violation, and not less than $200 nor more than $1000 for
any subsequent violation within five years.6" Even if the statute does not
expressly require increased penalties, however, subsequent violations are
likely to result in increased penalties under most schemes, since statutes
often require or allow the penalty imposing authority to consider the vio-
lator's record of past violations.61
2. Methods to circumscribe penalty amounts
This discussion demonstrates that in the environmental area, state
civil penalty statutes generally set wide monetary limits within which
courts or agencies may assess penalties. The reason for this wide latitude
is the inability of a legislative body to foresee all situations in which pen-
alties will be applied.62 Consequently, the legislature must rely on the
court's or the agency's exercise of discretion under a statute.
If the agency rather than a court imposes the penalty, important
institutional considerations arise. Courts serve a well-recognized consti-
tutional function in imposing penalties; in contrast, agencies are gener-
ally creations of legislatures rather than state constitutions. For this
reason alone, such a broad delegation of economic authority to an agency
$5000 for each violation and additional penalties of not more than $500 for each day during
which the violation continues after receipt of a compliance order from the Department of
Environmental Protection. The statute also requires the amount assessed to fall within a range
established through regulation by the Commissioner for violations of a similar type, serious-
ness and duration. Id. See infra notes 151-52.
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.114(a)(1) to (a)(2) (1983). Under this section, air pol-
lution violators may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $5000, with each day consid-
ered a separate offense, only after written notification from the Environmental Management
Commission. Id.
60. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 94.71(l)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985). An Arizona statute directs a
state commission regulating certain kinds of waste to establish administrative sanctions deter-
mined by the severity and category of violation. Under the commission's rules, if the violation
is repeated within five years, the penalty increases by 25%. ARIz. ADMIN. COMP. R.12-1-1202
(1983).
61. See infra text accompanying note 134.
62. See Lawrence, supra note 41, at 407. "A variable monetary penalty enables an admin-
istrative agency to tailor the amount to both the offense and its perpetrator, neither of which
can be precisely foreseen by the legislature." Id.
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bears close examination to determine if the agency is using that power in
an appropriate manner.13 Even more importantly, effective environmen-
tal protection depends upon vigorous but fair enforcement, and the
agency's use of the penalty power could be either insufficient to deter
violators or excessive for the offense. Thus, particular attention should
be given to whether the delegation could be structured more tightly to
achieve the legislative purpose in the environmental law area.
Two legislative alternatives are available to circumscribe the exer-
cise of penalty power by environmental agencies more narrowly. First,
the legislative body could draft the statute to limit agency discretion.
However, specification in this manner is feasible only where the legisla-
ture can easily foresee the manner of violation,' and the paucity of such
statutes testifies to the difficulty of this undertaking.
A second possibility is more feasible: requiring the agency to struc-
ture its discretion by establishing penalty amounts through rulemaking
or similar interpretive endeavors." The Connecticut Environmental
Protection Act66 exemplifies this approach. It requires the Commis-
sioner of Environmental Protection to adopt schedules "establishing the
amounts, or the ranges of amounts, of the civil penalties which may be-
come due under this section."67 The Act itself merely sets the outer lim-
its of those penalty amounts. 8 As an alternative, a statute could direct
the agency to establish a schedule of penalties for specific types of viola-
63. Broad-based delegations of power to administrative agencies conflict with traditional
notions of democracy, particularly the separation of powers principle. See R. PIERCE, S. SHA-
PIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 25 (1985). The authors comment
that "[i]mportant questions concerning the legitimacy of the administrative law process have
arisen because agency government has developed in a manner that appears to violate the classi-
cal definition [of democracy]." This conflict gives rise to demands for increased scrutiny of the
administrative process.
64. The California Water Code contains a limited attempt at such quantification. It au-
thorizes a Regional Water Quality Control Board to impose a penalty for certain violations "in
an amount which shall not exceed ten dollars ($10) for each gallon of waste discharged." CAL.
WATER CODE § 13350(e)(1) (West Supp. 1986). A superior court may impose liability for the
same violations in an amount not to exceed $20 for each gallon of waste discharged. Id.
§ 13350(e)(2). Where the characteristics of the type of pollutant discharged also can be fore-
seen, statutory quantification is even more feasible. See VA. CODE § 62.1-44.34:4 (1982) ($250
limit for failure to report oil spills up to 2500 gallons; $500 limit for oil spills up to 10,000
gallons; $10,000 limit for oil spills of more than 10,000 gallons).
65. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-687B (Supp. 1985) (for radiation); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 455B.109 (West Supp. 1985) (water, air and waste management); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 444.7402(b), 445.6102 (1979) (hazardous waste and air pollution); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10A-10d (West 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 468.130(l) (1983) (air pollution); WYO. STAT.
§ 35-11-901(c) (Supp. 1985) (various violations).
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-1 to -27 (1985).
67. Id. § 22a-6b(a).
68. Id.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
tions, leaving the agency flexibility in assessing penalties in other situa-
tions.69 Nevada, for example, requires its water pollution commission to
establish by regulation a schedule of administrative fines not exceeding
$500 for "lesser violations" of certain statutes and regulations."
The rulemaking mechanism provides several advantages over the
protypical broad, unstructured delegation authorizing assessment of pen-
alties. The agency can tailor the penalties in light of the particular en-
forcement problems it faces, problems that can vary depending on the
location of the agency's jurisdiction, the characteristics of the regulated
community and the pollutant regulated. The enforcing agency is in a
better position than the legislature to render judgments about specific
penalty policy, since those decisions entail use of the type of expertise for
which the agency was established. Additionally, because the rulemaking
process normally will allow for public comment,71 regulated entities and
other interested parties will have the opportunity to influence the rules,
thereby increasing the rules' legitimacy. While public comment is not as
valuable in the penalty area as it is when the agency is adopting substan-
tive regulations,72 public input still could be useful.73 Lastly, the breadth
of the penalty imposition powers found in the environmental area raises
fears of unchecked discretionary power that could be exercised in a man-
ner inconsistent with the statutory purpose. To some extent, establishing
penalty schedules by rulemaking encourages the agency to further con-
sider the relationship between the transgression and the penalty, thus
promoting more rational use of its penalty discretion.
The possibility exists, however, that while the agency may adopt
rules, they may contain few constraints circumscribing its discretion.
69. This type of scheme was apparently intended in recent hazardous waste legislation
enacted in Tennessee. The Tennessee legislation directs the Solid Waste Disposal Board to
"promulgate and adopt rules and regulations establishing a schedule of administrative penalty
amounts for certain specific non-discretion [sic] violations or categories of violations estab-
lished by this part." TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-114(c)(2) (Supp. 1985). See also id. § 69-3-
115(a)(3).
70. NEv. REV. STAT. § 445.601(2) (1979). See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.109 (West
Supp. 1985) (commission may establish by rule a schedule or range of penalties for "minor
violations of this chapter or rules, permits or orders adopted or issued under this chapter").
71. Presumably the agency establishing the rules would use informal "notice and com-
ment" rulemaking, rather than more formal procedures. See Model State Adminstrative Pro-
cedure Act (U.L.A.) § 3(a) (1980) (prior to adoption of any rule agency shall afford all
interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in
writing).
72. See Diver, supra note 35, at 311.
73. Generally, commentators agree that rules will be better fashioned as a result of public
participation. See, eg., Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and
Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520, 573-75 (1977).
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The agency may seek to preserve maximum flexibility in the rules, believ-
ing that flexibility will enhance its bargaining position in any settlement
negotiations.74 If the agency takes this position, these benefits of
rulemaking would be thwarted.
B. Penalty Assessment Criteria
1. The purpose and theoretical basis of penalty criteria
Since most penalty statutes prescribe a "per day" or "per violation"
penalty within broad dollar limits, the monetary provisions of the penalty
statutes offer little indication of the actual penalty that will be assessed
for a particular violation. As a result, the primary question becomes how
the individual penalty will be fixed within those limits. The penalty crite-
ria found in environmental penalty statutes are central to answering this
question.
a. the need for penalty standards
Commentators have persuasively argued that penalty imposition
standards are necessary.75 As Professor Davis summarized the problem,
discretionary power can be either too broad or too narrow, but in Ameri-
can law the problem is primarily the former.76 He suggests that discre-
tion be "confined," principally through rulemaking, and "structured"
through such means as policy statements, rules and findings.77
Penalty standards serve two separate but related functions. First,
they indicate the underlying goals that the legislative body intends the
penalty process to serve. Civil penalty statutes theoretically can serve a
74. For example, the Oregon "Air Quality Schedule of Civil Penalties" constrains the
agency only minimally in some areas. A violation of an order of the Environmental Quality
Commission, the Department of Environmental Quality or any regional air quality authority
will call for a penalty "[n]ot less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than ten thousand
dollars ($10,000)." OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-12-050 (1986). On the other hand, the Depart-
ment's "Noise Control Schedule" is more circumscribed. See, e.g., id. § 340-12-052 (defining
the penalty for certain violations as "[n]ot less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than
five hundred dollars ($500)").
75. See Diver, supra note 35, at 288. "The proposition that persons charged with the
determination of penalties should be guided by reasonably clear, complete and objective poli-
cies seems too obvious to warrant prolonged discussion. Others have made the case for stan-
dards so often and so forcefully as not to require repetition." Id. (citing, inter alia, Dickinson
v. Davis, 277 Or. 665, 561 P.2d 1019 (1977)). In a lengthy comment on mitigation of civil
penalties, the Dickinson court observed that "[a]dministrative discretion is not a magic word.
It is only a range of responsible choice in pursuing one or several objectives more or less
broadly indicated by the legislature ...." Id. at 673, 561 P.2d at 1023.
76. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 52 (1969).
77. Id. at 54-55, 97.
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range of purposes that are not always consistent with each other.7" A
clearly drawn penalty statute informs the court or the agency of the legis-
lature's choice of penalty goals and the relative priority to be accorded
them. In doing so, the statute gives important direction to the penalty
imposing body when it assesses a penalty and helps ensure the legitimacy
of that process.
In addition to establishing the goals of the penalty process, statutory
criteria serve as standards for the actual assessment of the penalty. The
penalty goals and the assessment standards are closely related, since the
standards will implement the overall penalty goals.7 9 For example, a
statute could establish compensation for environmental harm as the un-
derlying purpose of the civil penalty, and then direct the court or agency
to consider specific criteria designed to achieve compensation in assessing
the actual penalty.
Indeed, discussion over the need for penalty criteria is academic.
The question is not whether penalty criteria should exist but who will
establish them, for the act of fixing a penalty requires the imposing au-
thority to exercise some discretion. That discretion necessarily is based
on standards; 0 if they are not established statutorily, the agency perforce
will act under its own standards. However, those criteria will not be
legitimized through legislation and, in the worst case, may be unarticu-
lated and thus unknown to the penalized party.
b. goals of civil penalty systems in environmental law
Before examining the actual penalty criteria in the state statutes, a
brief discussion of the theoretical goals that civil penalty statutes could
serve in the environmental area is necessary. This examination estab-
lishes the groundwork for determining whether the goals found in state
statutes either adhere to or deviate from these theoretical ends.
"Civil" monetary penalties by definition are non-criminal, and com-
mentators frequently observe that they are not principally intended to
punish the violator."1 Nevertheless, the concept of punishment relates
78. See infra text accompanying notes 81-94.
79. See Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by FederalAdminis-
trative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1461 (1979). Concerning the relationship between
penalty standards and the purposes of the penalty, Professor Diver comments: "In order to
frame a set of standards for determining the penalty amount appropriate for an individual
violation, one must first identify the purpose or purposes the penalty is intended to serve." Id.
80. See Diver, supra note 35, at 289. The author terms the argument for penalty standards
in one space "academic," since a penalty scheme can be administered only by applying some
set of standards. Id.
81. Comment, supra note 13, at 445-46.
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closely to deterrence, one of two main purposes that environmental civil
penalty statutes may be designed to serve.8 2 Deterrence is not, of course,
a civil penalty goal peculiar to environmental regulatory mechanisms.
Civil penalty statutes are included in a broad range of regulatory pro-
grams that prohibit entities and persons from certain actions or require
conformance to specified criteria. However, deterrence can be a particu-
larly important goal in environmental statutes because of the theoretical
ability to calculate with some precision a penalty that would deter
violators.8 3
When polluters transgress environmental standards, they often
avoid pollution control costs that they would otherwise incur in comply-
ing. If those costs can be calculated, a penalty exceeding this amount
would deter polluters from violating the regulatory standard. In other
words, if the penalty amount exceeds the cost of compliance, an econom-
ically rational company would choose compliance in order to minimize
its costs.8 4 Thus, a penalty would achieve the objective of deterrence by
forcing a regulated entity to pay pollution control costs that it would
avoid if it did not comply.
85
This relationship between deterrence and compliance costs, a rela-
82. Marshall, supra note 17, at 330-3 1; Schachter, Some Criteria for Evaluating State and
Local Air Pollution Control Laws, 14 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 583, 635 (1973). See also
State ex rel. Brown v. Howard, 3 Ohio App. 3d 189, 191, 444 N.E.2d 469, 471 (1981) ("Sub-
stantial penalties are recognized as a mechanism for deterring conduct which is contrary to a
regulatory scheme"). But see People ex rel. California Reg. Water Qual. Control Bd. v. De-
partment of Navy, 371 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (court refused to impose civil penalty for
an oil spill on ground it was a punitive action).
83. A recent EPA survey of hazardous waste enforcement officials at both the federal and
state levels in five EPA Regions and five states asked interviewees to rank the importance they
attached to a series of possible penalty criteria. The criteria included deterrence, returning the
violator to compliance, ensuring equity among sources, ensuring consistency by taking similar
action among sources, correcting environmental damage and removing the economic benefit of
non-compliance. The survey concluded that "[a] majority of the State, Region and Headquar-
ters RCRA offices interviewed listed deterrence as the major goal of a penalty assessment for
that program." ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, EPA/STATE PER-
CEPTIONS REGARDING PRACTICES AND OVERSIGHT OPTIONS 1 (1985).
84. Note, Deterring Air Polluters Through Economically Efficient Sanctions: A Proposalfor
Amending the Clean Air Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 807, 813 (1980). The author states that
"[u]nder the economic theory of deterrence, the 'optimal'-most efficient and effective-eco-
nomic deterrent is the fine that when discounted by the probability of detection just equals the
economic value of noncompliance." Id. Simply setting the fine at the amount of money saved
by the company through noncompliance is insufficient, since the company also will consider its
chances of the violation being discovered. Accordingly, under this theory the amount of the
penalty should be such that, when it is multiplied by the chance that the violation will be
detected, the result equals the amount saved by the company through noncompliance. Id. at
812.
85. See supra note 82.
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tionship that is the basis for the so-called "noncompliance" penalties
under the federal Clean Air Act,8 6 is the central focus of the penalty
policy adopted by EPA. The EPA policy observes that "[i]f a penalty is
to achieve deterrence, both the violator and the general public must be
convinced that the penalty places the violator in a worse position than
those who have complied in a timely fashion."87 To accomplish this
goal, the EPA policy declares that, at a minimum, penalties should re-
move any significant economic benefits resulting from a failure to comply
with the law.8" If the penalty is set at a level less than that amount, the
regulated community is encouraged to wait until an enforcement agency
takes action before complying.
89
Civil penalties to redress environmental violations also may serve a
second goal: compensation.9° Pollution causes harm to both human
health and to inanimate objects, a fact that many pollution statutes ex-
plicitly recognize.91 An environmental civil penalty statute could in-
struct the penalty imposing authority to set a penalty at a level that will
compensate the public for the harm caused by the regulatory violation.
The goal of compensation is generally consistent with that of eco-
nomic deterrence discussed above; both are designed to force polluters to
internalize costs that otherwise would be imposed on society as a
whole.92 However, calculating a penalty to achieve compensation is not
86. CAA § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1982). This section requires EPA to impose adminis-
trative penalties for stationary source violations that are calculated to recover the economic
value of noncompliance. Id.
87. POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 3.
88. Id. The EPA policy terms this amount the "benefit component," of the penalty. It
then states that a second amount, a "gravity component," must be added to give a "prelimi-
nary deterrence" figure. Id. at 4.
89. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN AIR ACT STATIONARY SOURCE CIVIL PEN-
ALTY POLICY 5 (1984). "[S]ettling for an amount which does not remove the economic benefit
of noncompliance can encourage people to wait until EPA or the State begins an enforcement
action before complying. For this reason, it is general Agency policy not to settle for less than
this amount." Id.
90. Diver, supra note 35, at 285. "A second function which might conceivably be served
by a civil money penalty is compensation .... Money penalties can... be utilized to serve a
'general' compensation function-that is, to compensate 'society' at large for harm which it
has suffered at the hands of a violator." Id. See also United States v. W.B. Enter., 378 F.
Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (observing that purpose of a civil penalty for discharge of oil under
the Clean Water Act was to compensate government for environmental damage).
91. See, e.g., CAA § 109,42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982) (requiring EPA to adopt "health-based"
primary ambient air quality standards and "welfare-based" secondary ambient air quality
standards).
92. See E. YANG, R. DOWER & M. MENEFEE, THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN
VALUING NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE 1 (1984). The authors note that, in the case of
spills,
[t]he users are often required to compensate the owners of the resource, private or
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a simple task. While a polluter's avoided costs of compliance can be
measured with some degree of precision, the methodology for quanti-
fying environmental harm is not as well developed. 9 Nonetheless, be-
cause the existence of the harm is undoubted, we would expect
compensation often to be a clearly articulated penalty goal in state civil
penalty statutes, even if the implementation of that goal is problematic.
Environmental civil penalty statutes could fulfill other purposes as
well. For example, a statute could require the penalty authority to for-
mulate penalties in a manner that is predictable or consistent,94 ends that
are important to the regulated community. The statute might also stress
that penalties are to take into account a violator's ability to pay. The
legislative body would thereby emphasize that the penalty assessor must
consider a broad array of economic interests, not merely compensation
for harm or deterrence through full recovery of costs that the violator
has avoided.
With these possible purposes for a penalty statute in mind, we now
examine the state statutes to determine the extent to which they serve
these theoretical goals.
2. The criteria in the state penalty statutes
a. deterrence and avoided economic costs
Despite the importance of penalty goals to the functioning of a pen-
alty system, a significant percentage of state penalty statutes contain no
criteria. Instead, they leave the penalty totally in the hands of the court
or agency, unencumbered by legislative direction concerning the pur-
poses that the penalty is to serve or how it is to be set.95 The lack of
direction indicates that, in those states at least, the legislative bodies have
public, so that the cost of subjecting the resources to spills and releases is fully incor-
porated into the cost of the commercial use. Only under a compensation scheme
which requires internalization of such costs can society attain the best use of the
coastal resources.
Id.
93. Id. Yang, Dower and Menefee observe that the compensation system traditionally has
broken down in situations where no economic market exists to value the resource damaged
and where the resource is held by public trustees rather than private parties. However, the
study continues on to note that in recent years much progress has been made in addressing
these problems. Id.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) also alludes to the difficulty of quanti-
fying environmental harms. NEPA requires federal agencies to insure that presently unquanti-
fled environmental amenities and values are given appropriate consideration in governmental
decisionmaking. NEPA § 102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1982).
94. See Diver, supra note 79, at 1457.
95. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-52(a) (1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-17-29(1) (Supp.
1985).
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given little thought to the proper role of penalty imposition in the regula-
tory scheme. Most statutes, however, set forth a legislative intent con-
cerning how penalties should be determined. Indeed, they contain a vast
range of criteria serving varied and often conflicting purposes.
Surprisingly few statutes expressly require a court or agency to con-
sider deterrence of violations as a primary factor in imposing a penalty.
Kansas water pollution legislation is one of the most explicit of these
comparatively rare laws; a penalty assessed under that provision "shall
constitute an actual and substantial economic deterrent to the violation
for which it is assessed." 96 Connecticut lists as a factor the amount "nec-
essary to insure immediate and continued compliance,"97 while a Tennes-
see water pollution law states that the commission "may" consider
"[w]hether the civil penalty imposed will be a substantial economic de-
terrent to the illegal activity."9" Interestingly, a Maine statute forcefully
requires consideration of deterrence but strangely asks the court to focus
on the importance of setting a penalty to deter others-not the party on
whom the penalty is imposed-from similar violations.99
A small number of statutes are more explicit in addressing deter-
rence. By requiring the penalty authority to consider the monetary bene-
fits of noncompliance, 1°° they emphasize the economic role that penalties
can play in requiring companies to disgorge savings from avoided pollu-
tion control costs. North Carolina's air pollution control statute is per-
haps the most direct; it requires the Environmental Management
Commission to consider "the amount of money the violator saved by not
having made the necessary expenditures to comply with the appropriate
pollution control requirements."' 0'1 Similarly, a California water pollu-
tion statute mandates the agency assessing a penalty to evaluate the "eco-
nomic savings, if any, resulting from the violation."'0 2  Iowa's
Environmental Quality Act stresses that the "costs saved or likely to be
saved by noncompliance by the violator" are to be weighed." 3
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d(b) (1985).
97. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-6a(c)(1) (1985).
98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-3-115(a)(2)(D)(i) (Supp. 1985).
99. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 349(5)(D) (West Supp. 1985).
100. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:1073E(a)(v) (West Supp. 1986).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.114(a)(3) (1983).
102. CAL. WATER CODE § 13327 (West Supp. 1986); see also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6018.605 (Purdon Supp. 1985) ("savings resulting to the person in consequence of such
violation").
103. IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.109(1) (West Supp. 1985). See also ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.03.760(a)(3) (Supp. 1985), establishing as a factor "the economic savings realized by the
person in not complying with the requirement for which a violation is charged." "Economic
savings" is defined as the "sum which a person would be required to expend for the planning,
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Precise language like that included in these three statutes can send a
clear message to the agency or court imposing the penalty. If the statute
states that the court or agency "shall" consider deterrence, the penalty
imposing authority must carefully weigh the respondent's economic sav-
ings from noncompliance before imposing any penalty, since a penalty in
this amount will be the minimum penalty that could deter the violation.
Even if the statute is discretionary, declaring that the court or agency
"may" consider deterrence rather than requiring that consideration, this
statement would serve as some indication of legislative intent guiding the
penalty imposition process.
Other statutes seem to emphasize deterrence, although the language
of those enactments is less straightforward. If a court or agency is to
determine whether a penalty would deter violations, one consideration
might be the size of the business; the larger or more profitable the com-
pany, the larger the penalty needed to achieve deterrence. A small
number of statutes apparently adopt this reasoning by authorizing the
court or agency to consider the size of the business receiving the pen-
alty. " Presumably, Louisiana legislators were thinking of deterrence as
a goal when they included consideration of the "gross revenues generated
by respondent" in a penalty statute.10 5
Overall, however, few statutes on their face directly require consid-
eration of economic deterrent factors. 106 In fact, other penalty criteria
not specifically linked to deterrence appear more frequently in the state
statutes. These criteria could conflict with the goal of deterrence, partic-
ularly if deterrence is equated with setting a penalty at a level greater
than the respondent's avoided costs. For example, some provisions di-
rect the court or agency to weigh the violator's ability to pay a penalty,
while other statutes use terms like the "economic and financial condi-
tions of the person incurring a penalty"1 0 7 or the violator's ability to con-
tinue in business.10
These "ability to pay" factors, while appropriate regulatory consid-
acquisition, siting, construction, installation and operation of facilities necessary to effect com-
pliance with the standard violated." Id. § 46.03.760(d).
104. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-28(a)(2) (1985).
105. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1073E(3)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 1986).
106. STATE CIVIL PENALTY AuTHORITIES, supra note 16, at 28, citing only 10 penalty
statutes with deterrence listed as an explicit criteria. Thirty-five statutes include the economic
benefit of noncompliance as a criteria. Id.
107. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 468.130(2)(c) (1985); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-
6b(c)(5) (1985).
108. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13327 (West Supp. 1986); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-
306(5)(c) (1985).
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erations in a general sense,"' must be utilized in a sensitive manner to
avoid undermining statutory environmental objectives. For example,
regulatory prohibitions may be established to ensure that an industry as a
whole attains a minimum amount of pollution control, and the statutory
scheme may envision that a regulated entity should cease business if it
cannot afford the costs of compliance.1"' If the statute allows the penalty
authority to excuse or lower penalties to an amount below the avoided
cost of regulatory compliance, the statutory intent could be thwarted.
The "ability to pay" criteria are symptomatic of environmental
law's underlying ambivalence toward industrial closings caused by envi-
ronmental regulations, an ambivalence that a Tennessee statute illus-
trates. The statute explicitly warns that "[tjhe plea of financial inability
to prevent, abate or control pollution by the ... violator shall not be a
valid defense to liability." '111 Thus, economic infeasibility of compliance
cannot prevent liability. However, in setting the penalty the statute al-
lows the authority to consider the "social and economic value of the air
contaminant source" and the "economic reasonableness" of reducing or
eliminating the air emissions.112 These authorizations to consider eco-
nomics seem to include evaluation of the violator's financial state' 13 and
thus could undercut the statutory prohibition against considering finan-
cial ability to pay. In fact, the "reasonableness" language hearkens to the
traditional "balancing of the equities" under nuisance law,'14 a legal
principle that modem statutory environmental laws in many instances
were intended to overcome.
In summary, while some environmental civil penalty statutes ex-
pressly stress deterrence or avoided economic costs as criteria for deter-
mining the penalty, most are silent about these purposes. And a large
number of the statutes expressly require that the violator's ability to pay
109. Diver, supra note 35, at 302 (commenting that the principle that a penalty otherwise
appropriate should be adjusted to fit the financial circumstances of the violator is widely
acknowledged).
110. See, eg., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 69-72 (1980) (emphasiz-
ing that the Clean Water Act required firms to reduce pollution to a "best practical control
technology" floor or to cease discharging pollutants at all).
111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-25-116(c) (Supp. 1985).
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-25-106(2), (4) (Supp. 1985). Section 68-25-116(c) declares
that in assessing penalties the factors specified in section 68-25-106 may be considered.
113. The "economic reasonableness" of reducing or controlling pollution could easily be
construed to refer to the reasonableness from the violator's perspective. Similarly, the "eco-
nomic value" of the source would also appear to encompass at least part of the violator's
financial picture.
114. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 88A, at 631 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing "balancing the equities" under
nuisance law).
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must be considered, a factor that may conflict with and perhaps under-
mine the goal of deterrence.
b. compensatory criteria
Civil penalty statutes commonly require harm to be considered in
setting any penalty amount. Much used terms include the "gravity"1 '
of the violation or "significance" '116 of the harm caused and the "serious-
ness" of the violation. 117 Also common are references to the "extent"
118
or "nature" '119 of the violation.
Given the health-endangering effects of hazardous substances, civil
penalty statutes for hazardous waste violations might be expected to
stress consideration of those effects. Maryland's hazardous waste penalty
statute fulfills this expectation. The statute mandates consideration of
the extent that the violation, including its location, "creates the potential
for harm to the environment or to human health or safety" and the de-
gree of hazard posed by the waste materials involved. 120 The Massachu-
setts Hazardous Waste Management Act also addresses harm to health
but takes a different approach. That Act's civil penalty provision begins
by declaring that any violation shall be presumed to constitute irrepara-
ble harm to the public health, welfare and safety and to the environ-
ment. 121 Since the statute follows this presumption with provisions for
both criminal and court-imposed civil penalties, the presumption appar-
ently was intended to require the courts to focus carefully on the extent
of harm in setting any penalties.
122
115. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13327 (West Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:1073E(3)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-306(5)(C) (1985); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-215.91(a) (1983); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7110.308(e) (Purdon Supp.
1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-28(a)(2) (1985).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-306(5)(c) (1985) (factors include whether significant harm
resulted to health, the environment, agriculture, crops or livestock).
117. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 22-30-19(d) (1981); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-687B (West
Supp. 1985) ("whether the violation was of a serious nature"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10d
(West Supp. 1985).
118. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13350(g) (West Supp. 1986). See also NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 81-1508(I)(g) (Supp. 1983) ("the degree and extent of the pollution, and any injuries to
humans, animals, or the environment").
119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-687B (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
171s(a) (1985).
120. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-266(b)(2)(ii), (5), (7) (Supp. 1985).
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C, § 10 (West Supp. 1985). The statute expressly
makes the presumption rebuttable. Id.
122. Id. In a separate paragraph the statute also authorizes injunctive relief. The presump-
tion could be important in any request for such relief, if the state requires irreparable injury
before an injunction will issue. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES
§ 2.10, at 108 (1973). In many instances, however, courts find that the common law require-
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The statutory language used in requiring consideration of harm, and
thus indirectly establishing a compensation objective, is vague. Terms
such as "significance" or "gravity" of the harm lack precision, and their
open-endedness constitutes a legislative recognition of the difficulties in
quantifying environmental harm. In a few instances, however, legisla-
tures have required more specific quantification efforts from agencies.
North Carolina's oil spill and hazardous substances control legislation
lists "the estimated damages attributed to the violator" as a factor that
must be weighed. 2 3 This language seemingly mandates the Environ-
mental Management Commission to make an attempt to quantify the
damage before reaching a final decision on a penalty figure.
To reiterate, the state civil penalty statutes often reflect compensa-
tory objectives by setting forth broadly-worded criteria that require
courts or agencies to consider the harm from the violation. These stat-
utes indicate that many state legislatures intend civil penalties to fulfill
the objective of reimbursing the public for environmental harms.
c. fault and equity
A third set of civil penalty factors concerns neither deterrence nor
compensation, focusing instead on the culpability of the alleged violator.
But by injecting fault into the penalty imposition process, a significant
number of state civil penalty statutes introduce a factor that usually is
irrelevant to the initial finding of a statutory violation. Thus, even
though the statutory violation may be determined on a strict liability ba-
sis, the fault of the violator can lower the penalty.
Most civil penalty statutes are silent about the standard of liability
required before a violation may be found; they do not specify whether
fault in the form of negligence, recklessness or intent is needed. In con-
struing federal laws, EPA generally has interpreted statutory silence to
mean that Congress intended a strict liability offense. 24 At the state
ment of irreparable injury is not applicable in environmental cases. See, e.g., Environmental
Defense Fund v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 1983).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.91(a) (1983). The statute lists a number of other factors
and declares that a violator "shall incur" a penalty set by the Environmental Management
Commission "after taking into consideration" these factors. Id. Other statutes may allow an
agency to recover damages to natural resources in addition to a civil penalty. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-23-415(b)(3) (1983) (authorizing both the assessment of a civil penalty and dam-
ages, including "any reasonable expenses incurred in ... restoring the air, water, land and
other property, including animal, plant and aquatic life, of the state to their former
condition").
124. See A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO PENALTY ASSESS-
MENTS, supra note 40, at 17, noting that "most of the statutes which EPA administers are
strict liability statutes." The issue has been litigated in a number of reported cases under the
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level, while some statutes require a finding of fault before a penalty can
be imposed, 125 most are silent and can similarly be interpreted to fall into
the strict liability model.' 26 Consequently, a violation calling for a civil
penalty may be found without consideration of whether the violator ac-
ted negligently or with any other degree of fault.
The state penalty statutes consistently reject the idea that the viola-
tor's fault is irrelevant to all phases of the penalty process. Instead, they
emphasize that the penalty imposing authority is to consider both the
fault and attitude of the defendant in deciding the amount of the penalty.
In other words, even though absence of fault is not a defense to the viola-
tion, fault influences the penalty amount and, indeed, whether a penalty
is called for at all.
Some of the statutes focus directly on the culpability of the violator.
They commonly ask the penalty imposing authority to consider whether
the infraction was willful.' 27 Others introduce negligence terminology by
calling for inquiry into the "degree of care exercised by the offender"'
12
or "the extent to which the violator exercised reasonable care.'
'1 29
oil spill provisions of the Clean Water Act and courts have found that strict liability is called
for under that Act. See, e.g., United States v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 643 F.2d
1125, 1127 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co,,
611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305,
1306 (7th Cir. 1978).
Litigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA) also raises this question. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1912 (C.D. Cal. 1984); see also United States v. Liviola, 22 Env't Rep. Cases
(BNA) 2028, 2031 (N.D. Ohio 1985) ("Congress patterned the civil penalty violation provi-
sions of [RCRA] after the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, under which civil penalties are
strict liability offenses not requiring proof of willful intent").
125. See, e.g., Georgia's Hazardous Waste Management Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-81(a)
(1982) (authorizing a civil penalty to be ordered against any person "negligently or intention-
ally failing or refusing to comply with any final or emergency order of the director issued as
provided in this article").
Interestingly, in its regulations governing approval of state programs under federal legisla-
tion, EPA declares that state law should not provide a greater burden of proof and degree of
knowledge or intent than federal statutes require of EPA when it sues. The regulations also
have a "note" appended stating that "this requirement is not met if State law includes mental
state as an element of proof for civil violations." 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2) (1985) (Clean Water
Act regulations); see also 40 C.F.R. § 145.13(b)(2) (1985) (Safe Drinking Water Act
regulations).
126. See City of Galveston v. State, 518 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (refusing to
require state to prove scienter before court would assess civil penalty under state water pollu-
tion laws). For an example of the approach a court would take to decide whether some proof
of fault is required, see State v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 632 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1982). As this
case notes, the outcome may depend on legislative intent indicated in the provision's history.
127. See, eg., MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 8-1416(d) (1983).
128. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-306(5)(c) (1985).
129. See, e.g., MD. HEALTI-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 9-342(b)(2)(ii)(1) (Supp. 1985).
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The state penalty statutes also often require the decisionmaker to
examine conduct pre-dating the alleged violation as well as conduct oc-
curring after that violation. The statutes contain a variety of these fac-
tors, which might be termed "good faith" criteria. Those concerning
post-violation conduct include the violator's efforts to reduce or mitigate
the damage, 130 the steps taken to correct the violation,1 3 1 the effective-
ness of those steps,13 and the permittee's "demonstrated good faith."'
13 3
These types of post-violation factors are consistent with the underlying
goal that penalties should compensate for environmental harm, for if the
violator quickly remedied the violation, the harm would be minimized.
The purpose of examining pre-conduct violations, in contrast, is more
closely linked to pure deterrence. If the violator has a history of environ-
mental transgressions, particularly any serious enough to have merited a
penalty, the history would indicate the need for a more sizeable penalty
to deter future violations.1
3 4
Some statutes limit the relevancy of past violations. The statute
may authorize the agency to evaluate past violations only if they are
"part of a recurrent pattern of the same or similar type of violation, "135
or restrict consideration of previous violations to the specific operation
where the present violation occurred.136 For larger defendants, however,
the latter type of restriction is questionable. The deterrent impact of a
penalty on a corporation cannot be judged by its effect on a discrete oper-
ating unit of that entity. Instead, the regulatory compliance of a wider
component of the company would have to be examined to determine an
appropriate penalty amount.
137
d. other factors
While the categories outlined above account for the bulk of the pen-
alty criteria, two other types of criteria must be considered. First, vari-
ous states view civil penalties as at least a partial means of recouping
enforcement costs, listing these costs as one of the penalty factors. Some
130. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-1941-19413c (McKinney 1984).
131. See OR. REV. STAT. § 468.130(2)(a) (1983).
132. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-3-115(a)(2)(D)(v) (Supp. 1985).
133. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.101 1(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
134. See supra text accompanying note 87-89.
135. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 2-610.1(c)(iii) (Supp. 1985).
136. Ky. REV. STAT. § 350.990(1) (Supp. 1984).
137. See A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO PENALTY ASSESS-
MENTS, supra note 40, at 22, observing that with respect to larger corporations, it is sometimes
difficult to determine whether a previous instance of noncompliance should affect the penalty.
The policy declares that "the case development team should ascertain who in the organization
had control and oversight responsibility for the conduct resulting in the violation." Id.
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require the penalty authority to consider all enforcement costs, 138 while
others limit the evaluation to unusual or extraordinary expenses. 39 A
Wisconsin statute gives the flavor of these provisions; it authorizes the
court to assess an "additional penalty" to cover "a portion or all of the
total costs of the investigation, including monitoring, which led to the
establishment of the violation." 14
The second group of criteria is more troubling. A significant
number of statutes authorize the agency or court to evaluate any addi-
tional factor it deems pertinent. The usual method is for the statute to
list a series of factors and then to add that "other relevant factors" may
be considered.
14 1
These open-ended authorizations to enlarge the list of factors appar-
ently are intended to ensure equity in specific situations that arise during
the implementation of environmental penalty laws. But they also invite
the court or agency to consider factors that may be inconsistent with the
other criteria specifically identified in the statute. For example, a statute
may estabish compensation for environmental harm as the primary ob-
jective of the penalty process. However, this goal could be undermined
by consideration of some "other relevant factor" that causes reduction in
the penalty amount to a level not approximating compensation for that
harm. In the worst case, the penalty could be imposed without articula-
tion of the other factors deemed relevant.
3. Compromise and mitigation of penalties
The significant penalty amounts authorized by statute, the vague
criteria for penalty imposition and other practical factors1 42 tend to max-
imize the discretion provided to public agencies in deciding whether to
seek penalties. An additional statutory power provided to the agencies
also enhances that discretion. Many civil penalty statutes invest the
agency with explicit power to compromise or mitigate claims. 143 Typi-
cally, the statute authorizes the agency to "remit or mitigate any penalty
... or discontinue any action to recover the penalty upon such terms as
it, in its discretion, shall deem proper."'"
138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.1073E(3)(a)(ix) (West Supp. 1986).
139. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-114(b)(3)(D) (Supp. 1985).
140. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 147.21(5) (West 1974).
141. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 691.605(a) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
142. See infra text accompanying note 287.
143. The two concepts are substantially the same. By definition, any difference between
them concerns the need for agreement of the party as well as the imposing authority; mitiga-
tion need not be consensual. See Diver, supra note 35, at 216.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.91(a) (1983).
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Even in the many cases where the statute is silent on whether the
agency may mitigate, public agencies almost always construe their au-
thorization to impose penalties as including a power to compromise.
1 45
Statutes rarely constrain the agency's ability to compromise claims.
When a constraint exists, it may limit the amount of the penalty that may
be compromised to a percentage of the original assessment. 146 Another
alternative is to include specific criteria in the statute governing the use
of the mitigation power along with a general grant of authority to
mitigate.147
While legislatures routinely include authority to compromise or mit-
igate claims in civil penalty statutes, the need for this authority is ques-
tionable. The previous analysis of statutory penalty amounts in this
Article demonstrates that agencies already possess wide discretion to
seek penalties within broad dollar limits. To a large degree, an authori-
zation to mitigate or compromise duplicates the grant of discretion in the
penalty statute. Moreover, that authorization could be counterproduc-
tive. While agencies should strive for consistency in imposing penalties,
they could construe statutes authorizing compromise or mitigation as
justifying inconsistent penalty settlements.' 48
145. See Diver, supra note 35, at 217-18, noting that the utility of a "mitigaton" clause-an
authorization for unilateral reduction of a penalty by the agency-is questionable:
[Congress] has quite freely incorporated mitigation clauses in agency-assessment
variable-penalty statutes.... The utility of a mitigation clause in this context is far
from obvious. A variable-penalty statute clearly empowers-indeed, implicitly di-
rects-the decisionmaker to consider "mitigating" factors in assessing the penalty.
And an explicit delegation of authority to "assess" a penalty would seem to subsume
a power to compromise the claim.
Id.
146. See ALA. CODE § 22-30-19(g) (Supp. 1985). The statute authorizes the board to com-
promise and settle any hazardous waste penalty "in such amount, which in the discretion of
the board may appear appropriate and equitable, to a maximum of 90 percent of the penalty."
The compromise is limited to situations when, within one year or such other period as the
board deems reasonable, the person takes action to eliminate or correct the violation. Id.
147. For example, Washington hazardous waste law contains a broad grant of mitigation
authority but requires the department to "giv[e] consideration to the degree of hazard associ-
ated with the violation." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.105.080(2) (Supp. 1986).
148. If that situation occurs, any challenge to the agency's use of the mitigation power by
the agency is unlikely. Except in the rare instance where a third party may challenge a settle-
ment, court tests of the agency's ability to reach settlement in civil penalty cases would not be
expected. The issue conceivably could arise if a citizen's suit were filed against a defendant
who had settled with the enforcement agency or where some sort of enforcement action was
ongoing. Litigation over the circumstances under which agency enforcement precludes citizen
suits is becoming increasingly common. See, e.g., Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d
215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828
(W.D.N.Y. 1983); Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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4. Methods for narrowing administrative discretion in penalty criteria
As this analysis reveals, many penalty statutes contain no criteria
for guiding the penalty determination. Other statutes set forth specific
criteria but leave those criteria open-ended, allowing the court or agency
widespread latitude to consider additional factors deemed relevant. As a
consequence, a court or agency imposing a penalty often has insufficient
guidance in settling on a dollar amount, and similar violations could be
treated in dissimilar fashions. The result may be an arbitrary penalty
system, particularly in light of the high penalty amounts authorized on a
daily or per violation basis. 149
As noted above, commentators have persuasively argued that agen-
cies should attempt to structure further their penalty processes and to
narrow the range of discretion.15 The legislative body could give the
agency rulemaking authority to specify the penalty criteria it will follow.
Alternatively, if the agency does not have rulemaking authority, it could
adopt interpretive policies.
If the rulemaking option is used, the penalty statute could set outer
monetary limits and require the agency to adopt standards that specify
the circumstances when a certain range of penalties is appropriate. New
Jersey has chosen this route; its Water Pollution Control Act declares
that the amount assessed shall fall within a range established by regula-
tion for "violations of similar type, seriousness, and duration." 15 1 The
state's regulations implement this delegation impressively. For example,
the "seriousness" factor is broken down into four categories of violation,
which are described in detail.
152
Alternatively, a statute may prescribe penalty criteria and authorize
the agency to supplement those criteria by rulemaking. A Louisiana stat-
ute uses this approach, establishing certain statutory factors and then
explicitly empowering the enforcement official to "supplement such crite-
ria by rule." '153 If no statute specifically authorizes the agency to adopt
149. See supra text accompanying notes 42-49.
150. See, eg., Diver, supra note 35, at 288-89. Diver argues for publication of penalty stan-
dards for the following reasons:
Revelation tends to reduce the disparities that inevitably arise in a system of secret
law between those who have access to or the ability to decipher the rules and those
who do not. It enhances accuracy by giving respondents some indication of the
factors that will govern their case and to which they should address their arguments.
Finally, it enhances the overall quality of decisionmaking by facilitating the self-
correction of official errors.
Id. at 309-10.
151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10d (West Supp. 1985).
152. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7A, §§ 7:14-8:10 (1984).
153. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1073E(3)(b) (West Supp. 1986).
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penalty criteria, the agency could use generic rulemaking powers under
its organic statute for this purpose.
154
Rulemaking also could be used to narrow the agency's discretion in
settling claims, or at least to require an explanation for the exercise of
discretion in mitigating penalties. Connecticut has taken some steps in
this area, requiring the Commissioner of Environmental Protection to
explain his reasons for mitigating any penalty.'
Even if the agency has no rulemaking authority, it could adopt in-
terpretive policies to guide its penalty discretion. EPA has followed this
course, formulating interpretive policies for major regulatory programs
that detail how the agency will proceed in imposing penalties. 5 6 The
EPA civil penalty policy is particularly noteworthy for its efforts to es-
tablish a methodology for weighing various penalty criteria,"5 7 an issue
almost never addressed by state civil penalty statutes. Several states also
have attempted to establish interpretive penalty policies. Is 8
This discussion does not assume that penalty criteria are a panacea,
for they unquestionably have practical limits. A mathematical scale for
computing penalties cannot be constructed,"' nor would it be a good
idea. Because penalty criteria such as harm and seriousness of the viola-
tion are not capable of precise quantification, the agency cannot bind
itself to specific dollar penalty figures through predetermined criteria.
Nonetheless, agency penalty statutes are currently so open-ended as to
invite inconsistent decisionmaking, or at least the appearance that the
agency penalizes in an arbitrary manner. Penalty criteria adopted by
154. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-4213(b) (Supp. 1985) (Any person violating the Act, a
rule, or a permit "may in accordance with the regulations issued by the Commission be as-
sessed a civil penalty by the Commission."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-22(f) (Supp. 1985)
("The Commission shall adopt rules concerning the imposition of administrative penalties
under this section.").
155. Connecticut regulations allow the Commissioner of Environmental Protection, pursu-
ant to explicit statutory authorization, to mitigate penalties. However, the Commissioner must
maintain a record "of each instance in which he corrects a civil penalty." The record is to
include the amount of the penalty before and after mitigation, and a "summary of the grounds
for correction." CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-6b-503(h)(2) (1985).
156. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RCRA CIVIL PENALTY POLICY (1984);
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NEW CLEAN WATER ACT CIVIL PENALTY POLICY (1986);
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN AIR ACT STATIONARY SOURCE CIVIL PENALTY POL-
ICY (1984).
157. POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 3-4 (calling for calculation of a "pre-
liminary deterrence figure" based generally on avoided economic costs, which can then be
adjusted by consideration of factors such as degree of culpability, history of noncompliance
and ability to pay).
158. See STATE CIVIL PENALTY AUTHORITIES, supra note 16, at 70-93.
159. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7A, § 7:14-8.10(a)(2) (1984) (noting that a "strictly mathe-
matical scale for computing seriousness cannot practically be devised").
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agencies can avoid these possibilities; at the same time, they will en-
courage settlement by assuring violators that they are being treated con-
sistently. Additionally, although agency penalty policies do not bind
courts if the penalties are judicially imposed, they can provide guidance
to courts facing the task of putting a dollar figure on environmental
violations.
160
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES IN ASSESSING PENALTIES
A. Judicial or Administrative Penalty Assessment
An important institutional choice that legislatures face is whether a
state enforcement agency or a court should assess the civil penalty.' 6' In
recent years a trend has emerged to place this power in the agencies
rather than the courts. As a result, the state penalty statutes have estab-
lished various procedures that the agencies must use to impose a penalty.
1. The constitutionality of agency assessment power
Traditionally, civil penalty statutes have empowered the courts
rather than administrative agencies to assess penalties. For a long period
of time, legal analysts questioned whether assessing penalties was an ap-
propriate task for administrative agencies.' 62 In contrast, penalty impo-
sition has always been an accepted judicial function.
Doubts also existed concerning the constitutional validity of agency-
assessed penalties. Some argued that courts would treat civil penalty
proceedings as criminal in nature, and thus not suitable for administra-
tive execution. The applicability of sixth and seventh amendment protec-
tions lurked in the background, and other due process claims could be
envisioned. 6 Finally, widespread authorization of civil penalty powers
160. See State ex rel. Brown v. Dayton Malleable, 1 Ohio St. 3d 151, 153, 438 N.E.2d 120,
125 (1982) (trial court used EPA civil penalty policy as a guideline for assessing a penalty).
161. Marshall, supra note 17, at 335; Schmeltzer & Kitzes, supra note 14, at 850-61 (dis-
cussing the two approaches).
162. In 1955, for example, the Hoover Commission Task Force on Legal Services and Pro-
cedure warned of the problems in delegating penalty assessment to agencies. See I COMMIS-
SION ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL
SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 242-44 (1955) (warning that the assessment power should not be
delegated to agencies except under strict procedural safeguards).
163. See, eg., Kirst, Adminstrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court's As-
sault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281 (1978); Levin, OSHA and the Sixth
Amendment: When Is a "Civil" Penalty Criminal in Effect?, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013
(1978); Comment, Administrative Civil Money Penalties and the Right to Jury Trial, 33 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 719 (1976); Comment, The Imposition of Administrative Penalties and the
Right to Trial by Jury-An Unheralded Expansion of Criminal Law?, 65 J. CRIMINOLOGY L. &
C. 345 (1974); Note, Judicial Review-Defendant Has Right to Trial by Jury and Trial Do
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to agencies surely would give rise to arguments under both the non-dele-
gation and separation of powers doctrines."6
With congressional enactment of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) 1 5 and other statutes authorizing agencies to assess
penalties, 116 litigants raised these issues before the courts. As a result,
the constitutional doubts largely have been set to rest. Courts have af-
firmed that civil penalties are not criminal fines, 167 do not require sixth
amendment criminal protections, 68 and do not violate the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial. 1 69 They also have held that legislative
delegation of factfinding and adjudicatory functions to an administrative
body does not violate the separation of powers doctrine,170 and have re-
jected delegation challenges.
17 1
Consequently, the courts have now generally approved the constitu-
Novo in Action Seeking Civil Penalties for Violation of Federal Trade Commission Order, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1035 (1975).
164. See, eg., B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 52 (1984) ("Many state judges adopt
a stricter attitude toward delegations than do their federal confreres.").
165. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)).
166. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 518, 30 U.S.C. § 1218 (Supp.
1986).
167. See, ag., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). The Court held that a penalty
provision of the Clean Water Act authorizing administrative imposition of penalties was civil.
Thus, it did not call for the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants; and
Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980). The court rejected a claim that a civil action
to assess a $10,000 penalty for violations of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act was
criminal in nature. The court reasoned that the penalty carried no collateral consequences
except a possible injunction, served a significant deterrent purpose and did not include arrest
and pre-trial detention. Id. at 909-10. See also Tundermann, Constitutional Aspects of Eco-
nomic Law Enforcement, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 41, 53 (1980) (economic penalties appear
to be civil, rather than criminal penalties).
168. See, eg., Mohawk Excavating Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
549 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting due process and sixth amendment challenges); Clarkson
Const. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976)
(same).
169. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Health & Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442, 460-61 (1977) (holding that absence of a provision for de novo judicial review does
not violate seventh amendment right to jury trial).
170. See, e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 503
F.2d 8, 11 (4th Cir. 1974) (reasoning that under OSHA, fact that agency exercised initial
adjudicative function did not render delegation invalid). As this Article goes into publication,
the Supreme Court has before it a case raising important separation of powers and delegation
issues. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986), prob. juris, noted, Bowsher v.
Synar, 54 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 10, 1986) (No. 85-1377).
171. See, e.g., City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146
(1974) (upholding constitutional validity of civil penalty provisions administered by Pollution
Control Board). The delegation challenge has been rejected in non-environmental areas as
well. See Thomas J. Peck & Sons v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 700 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1985).
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tional proposition that a statute may empower an agency to assess civil
penalties. The choice is a legislative one.
2. Statutory uncertainty over assessment power
Given the procedural ramifications of the decision whether an
agency or a court should impose the penalty, and that decision's impor-
tance to the enforcement process, one would expect the statutes clearly to
place the penalty power in one institution or the other. In fact, most
statutory schemes meet this expectation, leaving no doubt where the
power lies. North Carolina's air pollution control law, for example, sets
out a civil penalty limit and establishes the acts that constitute violations
of the law.17 The act then states that "[i]n determining the amount of
the penalty, The Commission shall consider" three specific factors. 73
Plainly, the statute authorizes the Commission to assess the penalty.
In contrast, the Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law in-
vests a court with this power. If the Department of Natural Resources
or the Hazardous Waste Management Commission determines that a vi-
olation has occurred or is in imminent danger of occurring, those agen-
cies may bring suit. The complaint can request injunctive relief or "the
assessment of a... penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars per day for
each day, or part thereof, the violation occurred and continues to occur,
or both, as the court deems proper."' 74 Once again, the statute unques-
tionably allocates the penalty authority.
A third possibility exists. The statutes may provide for both admin-
istrative and judicial assessment authority, as does the California Water
Code. 175 These types of statutes typically are explicit about the circum-
stances under which each body sets the penalty. 176
Surprisingly, however, a number of statutes on their face do not de-
finitively allocate the authority to assess penalties. 77  Two examples
from state hazardous waste legislation illustrate this situation:
-The Rhode Island Hazardous Waste Act includes a civil penalty
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.114(a)(1)(a)-(f) (1983).
173. Id. § 143-215.114(a)(3).
174. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.4251 (Supp. 1986).
175. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13261, 13265, 13268, 13350 (West Supp. 1986). These statutes
authorize both administrative and judicial penalties, with the latter available in higher dollar
amounts. For example, sections 13268(c) and (d) authorize an administrative penalty of up to
$5000 per day and a judicial penalty of up to $25,000 per day for discharging hazardous waste,
refusing to furnish certain reports or knowingly falsifying information. Id. § 13268(c)-(d).
176. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-24.3-6 (1985) (violators "shall be subject to a civil pen-
alty to be assessed by the court or the director").
177. See STATE CIVIL PENALTY AUTHORITIES, supra note 16, at 43, also noting this statu-
tory confusion.
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provision declaring: "Any person who shall violate the provisions of this
chapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant thereto, shall
be subject to a civil penalty, of not more than ten thousand dollars
. . -178 The statute is silent about whether the agency or the court
imposes the penalty, unlike other provisions of the act that require filing
of a complaint in court requesting penalties for unauthorized disposal. 179
-Nevada hazardous waste law makes violators "liable to the de-
partment for a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each day on
which the violation occurs." 180 The statute does not specify how the
penalty is to be imposed or collected; however, it authorizes the depart-
ment to "recover, in the name of the State of Nevada, actual damages
which result from a violation, in addition to the civil penalty." '181 Since
this language concerning damage recovery seems to refer to a judicial
action for damages, the different terminology used for the civil penalty
may imply that the agency has the power to assess that penalty. But this
interpretation is far from certain.
182
Of course, questions over penalty authority raised by the face of a
penalty statute do not necessarily have significant consequences. The un-
certainty may be cleared up by reference to other statutes or to a judicial
178. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.1-17 (1985). Each day of a continuing violation is deemed a
separate offense. Id.
179. See, e.g., id. § 23-19.1-22 (authorizing filing of a complaint requesting court to order
liability for the cost of containment, clean-up, restoration and removal of hazardous wastes).
180. NEv. REv. STAT. § 444.774 (1979).
181. Id.
182. The penalty provisions of the Montana Hazardous Waste Act seem to present a similar
problem. The act states that Montana's Department of Health and Environmental Sciences
"may institute and maintain in the name of the state any enforcement proceedings." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 75-10-417(2) (1985). This authorization could be read to imply administrative
assessment authority, since "proceedings" may refer to administrative rather than judicial au-
thority. See Athlone Indus. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1485, 1492 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (making distinction between "action" and "proceeding" in finding that statute au-
thorizing commission to "commence an action" did not authorize it to administratively assess
penalties).
But the Montana statute then declares that, "upon request of the department, the attor-
ney general or county attorney ... shall petition the district court to impose, assess, and
recover the civil penalty." MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-417(2) (1985). Conceivably, this lan-
guage could be interpreted in three different ways: (1) the agency has no authority to initially
impose a penalty; (2) the agency initially assesses the penalty, but that assessment is subject to
de novo review in the district court; or (3) the district court is to impose the penalty, perhaps
according some deference to the amount initially assessed by the agency.
See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 11 1F § 3(a) (Michie/Law. Coop. 1984) (giving the court
the power to levy penalties for violation of hazardous substance disclosure provisions, but also
allowing the commission to request the attorney general to "enforce any order issued or any
fine or penalty authorized by this section," thus perhaps indicating that the agency may first
impose a penalty).
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decision. However, commentators have observed that federal statutes
often exhibit the same type of ambiguity, '83 and this uncertainty over
penalty authority can affect enforcement. For example, environmental
agencies almost always follow a policy of attempting to resolve penalty
actions by negotiating with the violator before taking formal action to
recover a penalty. 18 4 If the alleged violator questions the agency's au-
thority to impose penalties, the agency may decide to compromise the
penalty amount rather than risk litigation that might reject the agency's
position.15
B. Agency Penalty Assessment Procedures
If the court is to assess penalties under the statute, with limited ex-
ceptions the litigation will proceed in much the same fashion as in other
civil cases. 186 In contrast, if the agency is to impose the penalties, pen-
alty procedures must be established. To meet this need, state penalty
statutes contain an array of procedural requirements, including methods
for issuing compliance orders, notice requirements, assessment mecha-
nisms, hearing procedures and appeal processes.
1. Initiating the assessment process
a. compliance procedures
Once an agency discovers a violation, it faces certain choices. The
agency could, of course, immediately initiate an administrative proceed-
ing to recover a penalty. However, the agency's primary goal will be to
ensure that the violation is swiftly corrected. Negotiating with the al-
leged violator rather than starting an adversary proceeding may attain
this goal more efficiently, particularly if the violation is relatively minor
and does not involve a discharge of pollutants at levels exceeding regula-
tory requirements. At the same time, if the violator proves willing to
remedy the problem quickly, the agency must determine how this reme-
dial action will affect any penalty assessment.
Because these considerations make the initial step of the penalty
183. See Goldschmid, supra note 14, at 906 (observing that "[t]here has been a great deal of
confusion about which, if any, federal agencies have the power to adjudicate under a true
administrative imposition scheme"); EPA Judicial Officer Says Agency Cannot Assess Fines for
Fuel Violations, 12 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1393 (Mar. 5, 1982).
184. See Goldschmid, supra note 14, at 919 (as of 1972, federal agencies "now settle well
over 90% of cases by means of a compromise, remission or mitigation device.").
185. See, e.g., Athlone Indus. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (rejecting the commission's authority to impose penalties administratively); Advance
Mach. Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 666 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1981) (same).
186. See infra text accompanying notes 262-67.
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process an important one, a number of state statutes contain procedures
that govern the agencies' conduct in this area. The statutes either au-
thorize or require agencies to take certain actions that are intended to
facilitate a rapid resolution of the matter at the outset of the penalty
process. 187
One statutory choice would have the agency withhold any assess-
ment of penalties until after the agency has requested the violator to cor-
rect the problem, and the violator has failed to act.' For example, in
Delaware the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and En-
vironmental Control may issue a thirty day notice to comply instead of
immediately seeking penalties. If the recipient does not comply within
that period, the Secretary can issue an order requiring compliance within
a specified time. Upon failure to meet that deadline, the violator "shall
be liable" for a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each day of continued
noncompliance.1
8 9
Other methods link compliance to the penalty assessment in a more
direct fashion. Under the Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act of
1973, the Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare may
commence an enforcement action by sending a written notice to the vio-
lator. The notice must specify the nature of the violation and the likely
actions the recipient should take to remedy the problem. It also must
state that the agency may impose a civil penalty if the violation is not
remedied within thirty days. 19° At the respondent's request, the parties
will hold a compliance conference within twenty days after the recipient
receives notice. If the parties agree on a plan to bring the recipient into
compliance, they may enter into a voluntary compliance agreement that
can include "monetary assessments in lieu of civil penalties."' 191 For
more serious violations, the statute authorizes the Director to prosecute a
civil enforcement action in court without previously engaging in the
compliance discussions.'
9 2
Several states provide agencies with the enforcement authority to
187. While provisions for cease-and-desist orders are common, see supra note 8, the types of
procedures discussed here differ from those orders because they are directly linked to the civil
penalty procedure.
188. Wisconsin has enacted a statute that facially seems to fit into this category. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 144.74(2) (West Supp. 1985) (declaring that for specified violations, "[t]he time
elapsed prior to the expiration of a compliance order shall not constitute a violation").
189. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6309(a)(l)-(2) (1983).
190. IDAHO CODE § 39-4413(1)(a) (1985).
191. Id. See also MD. HEALTH-ENVT'L. CODE ANN. § 2.610.1(b) (Supp. 1985) (requiring
the agency to provide the alleged violator "with written notice of the proposed action and an
opportunity for an informal meeting" before taking action).
192. IDAHO CODE § 39-4413(2) (1985).
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issue a compliance order with a conditional penalty. If the person fails to
take action within the specified period, the penalty would have to be
paid. This type of statute is usually silent about whether any penalty is
required if the order is complied with in a timely manner. 193
These types of mechanisms emphasize the importance of achieving
swift compliance without penalty assessment in appropriate situations,
such as when the regulatory transgression or the environmental harm is
minimal. However, they also raise disturbing questions about whether
they send the proper signal to regulated entities. If a statute requires that
a violator receive notice and a grace period in which to correct the viola-
tion prior to penalty assessment, some violators would view this require-
ment as an incentive to save compliance costs until the violation is
discovered. Thus, this type of compliance requirement can subvert the
purpose of the law it enforces.
The same problem exists, albeit in slightly altered form, with those
statutes that condition the penalty on compliance within a specified pe-
riod. Once again, the regulated entity may perceive a chance to avoid
penalties by taking quick action to remedy the violation. If that result
occurs, the statute weakens the deterrent effect of the penalty structure
by excusing any penalty for the violation that occurred during the period
before notice.
To avoid sending out the wrong signal, compliance procedures
should be more specific about whether a penalty remains appropriate if
the violator remedies the problem within the specified period. Rapid
compliance is a sign of the violator's good faith, a factor often included in
penalty criteria. That good faith may deserve a lessened penalty; it does
not, however, argue for no penalty whatsoever.
Finally, those statutes that make the use of such procedures
mandatory should at least preserve the agency's regulatory options to
deal with serious violations by immediately seeking penalties. For exam-
ple, under the Delaware scheme this compliance procedure is an alterna-
193. Alabama's hazardous waste legislation declares that the compliance order shall state
the nature of the violation and the time period within which compliance is required. ALA.
CODE ANN. § 22-30-19(d) (Supp. 1981). The statute goes on to state that if a person fails to
take the corrective action within the time period, "he shall be liable for civil monetary penal-
ties of not more than $25,000.00 each day for the violation complained of in such order." Id.
Arizona's low-level radiation legislation has a similar procedure: "The agency may in lieu of
imposing a civil penalty prescribe a time for elimination of the violation and assessment of a
civil penalty if the violation is not eliminated within the time prescribed by the order." ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-687A (West Supp. 1985). Cf Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.74(1) (West
Supp. 1985) ("The time elapsed prior to the expiration of a compliance order shall not consti-
tute a violation.").
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tive to be used at the discretion of the Secretary; the Secretary may seek
civil penalties in court "[i]n lieu of the compliance order procedure."
' 194
b. notice of violation
If the agency chooses to begin an assessment proceeding, it must
notify the responding party of the alleged violation. 195 The state penalty
statutes vary widely on the type of notice required and on hearing proce-
dures generally. Some statutes prescribe no notice whatsoever; they sim-
ply state that the enforcing officer or agency "may ... cause a hearing to
be conducted." 196 Other statutes declare only that the alleged violator is
to be "notified."'
197
Appropriately, most statutory provisions prescribe something more.
Notice is, of course, a central part of the alleged violator's due process
rights.198 Accordingly, the notice minimally must inform that party of
the penalty amount sought and of the alleged violations. However, the
penalty figure, while important, is not of paramount practical signifi-
cance to the alleged violator. Agencies often file formal penalty requests
for the statutory maximum while fully expecting to settle at a much
lower figure. 199
The critical information needed to begin preparing a response is the
factual basis for the alleged violation, and many statutes emphasize inclu-
sion of these facts in the notice. For example, a statute typically will
require the agency to "describ[e] such violation with reasonable particu-
larity." 2" A recent Arkansas radiation statute calls for more elaboration
in the notice, mandating the agency to set forth "the date, facts, and
194. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6309(b) (1983). For similar procedures, see also D.C. CODE
ANN. § 6-711 (1985).
195. Agencies often must give notice by certified mail. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
46-114(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1985) (alleged violator "shall receive notice of such assessment by cer-
tified mail, return receipt requested"). Personal service is, of course, an acceptable alternative.
See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-1709(4) (McKinney 1984) (authorizing either
personal service or service by registered or certified mail for notice of hearing issued by
commissioner).
196. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-9-23(b) (1981).
197. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-28 (1985) (notice and opportunity for hearing required prior
to imposition of civil penalty for pesticide violation).
198. Professor Schwartz has summarized the notice requirement as follows: "The right to
be heard includes the right to notice. Notice reasonably calculated to apprise parties of the
pendency of the proceeding and afford them an opportunity to present their case is an elemen-
tary requirement of due process." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 280-81 (1984).
199. See infra notes 287-95, discussing agencies' propensity to settle cases. Because of this
factor, the amount may be only a starting point for negotiations with little practical
significance.
200. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.350 (Supp. 1986).
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nature of each act or omission with which the person is charged" as well
as to identify specifically "the particular provision, or provisions of the
section, rule, regulation, order, license, or registration certificate involved
in the violation."2 ' An interesting Texas statute instructs the agency to
prepare a "preliminary report" stating the factual basis for the allegation
that a violation occurred and the recommended penalty.2"2
A number of states have established formal adjudicative hearing
processes. In those states, either the statute20 3 or the regulations 2" re-
quire the agency to give substantial notice to the responding party. The
agency will initiate the case by a complaint or similar document that
must contain allegations similar to those in judicial complaints.
Several reasons should encourage agencies to include a more com-
plete description of the factual basis for the penalty in the notice. A
skeletal notice can lead to demands for discovery, thus impeding swift
deterrence, a primary goal of the penalty process. Second, the content of
the notice might influence the recipient's decision whether to seek a
quick settlement or to contest the penalty by requesting a hearing. For
example, if the penalty was a small one and the notice stated that the
penalty was being imposed pursuant to a settled penalty policy, resisting
the penalty might not be an attractive option. The content of the notice
also would be important where the agency has adopted a penalty policy
or specific rules establishing penalty criteria and amounts. If the notice
explained the assessment in sufficient detail, a respondent would know
that the penalty sought was in line with penalties sought in similar situa-
tions. That knowledge might spur quick resolution of the matter.
Requiring a detailed notice is particularly important in states that
make the penalty assessment effective prior to any hearing.20 5 In those
states, the responding party will have a limited period in which to request
a hearing to contest the assessment. If no hearing is sought, the assess-
ment will become a final order, and the allegation in the notice must
serve as the factual findings of that order.
201. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1525(b)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1985).
202. TEX. CODE ANN. art. 4477-5 § 4.041(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
203. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13323(a) (West Supp. 1986) (complaints issued by the
executive officers of Regional Boards "shall allege the act or failure to act that constitutes a
violation of law, the provision of law authorizing civil liability to be imposed pursuant to this
article, and the proposed civil liability").
204. See, e.g., 25 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 21.57 (1986) (setting forth the "form and content" of
a complaint); id. § 21.64 (establishing general rules for pleading and stating that, except where
the rules provide otherwise, the various pleadings described in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure apply before the Pennsylvania Board). See also N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 14-8.4
(1984) (establishing notice requirements for the assessment of civil adminstrative penalties).
205. See infra note 214.
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c. requests for hearings and immediately effective assessments
Statutes commonly call for the notice to inform a respondent of the
right to a hearing on the violation.20 6 In some instances, the statute
seems to require a hearing whether the violator requests it or not.20 7 In
others, the agency must only afford an "opportunity for hearing"; if the
party does not affirmatively request that hearing, it is waived and the
penalty will take effect.208 In that event, the penalty will be subject to
collection in a court action in which the defendant cannot contest the
merits of the penalty assessment. 20 9 A Texas statute stakes out a middle
ground. If the alleged violator consents to the penalty or fails to respond
to the notice, the commission may either "assess that penalty or order a
hearing to be held on the findings and recommendations in the executive
director's report."'2 10
Washington's hazardous waste law provides a slight twist on the
normal process governing assessments made prior to hearing. In that
state, the penalty becomes payable unless the recipient applies for review
by the hearing board or applies for "remission or mitigation." ' This
provision bifurcates the available appeals. If the respondent applies only
for remission or mitigation and does not request a full hearing, only the
amount of the penalty, not the fact of the underlying violation, would
remain at issue.
Some states impose strict time limits on the period in which the re-
spondent must request the hearing. The period usually is not longer than
thirty days2 12 and may be as short as twenty
13 or even fifteen days.21 4
206. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-171s(e) (1985) (written order to state "the right of the
person... to appeal to the secretary for a hearing on the matter").
207. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-41(b) (1982) ("The director, after a hearing, shall
determine whether or not any person has violated any provision...."). While the statute may
require a hearing even if the alleged violator does not request it, due process is not violated if
the hearing is waived. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.4, at 206 (2d ed. 1984)
("As a general proposition, hearings are not required when no disputed issues are raised.").
208. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4.1F(2) (West Supp. 1986) ("No penalty shall be assessed
until the person charged shall have been given notice and an opportunity for a hearing on such
charge.... ."); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.2662(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (alleged viola-
tor must be "given an opportunity for a public hearing").
209. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-6b(e) (1985) (if no hearing is requested or request is
later withdrawn, notice becomes final order of commissioner and matters asserted or charged
in notice deemed to be admitted unless modified by consent order).
210. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 28.067(g) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
211. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105.080(3) (West Supp. 1986).
212. See, eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d(c) (1985).
213. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-6b(e) (1985) ("[t]he person to whom the notice is
addressed shall have twenty days from the date of receipt of the notice in which to deliver to
the commissioner written application for a hearing"); HAw. REv. STAT. § 340E-8 (1976)
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This requirement of a prompt response from the alleged violator illus-
trates the swiftness of the agency assessment procedure. If the respon-
dent is unsophisticated, his or her rights easily could be waived.
In contrast to states that use the notice merely to initiate the pro-
ceeding, under a number of statutory schemes the penalty is made effec-
tive immediately rather than after a hearing or opportunity for
hearing.215 Other states are silent, but their statutory language indicates
a later effective date.216 Whether the assessment is effective immediately
or becomes effective only after a hearing may have practical importance.
At least two states follow the model established by the federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)2 17 requiring that a vio-
lator place the amount of a fine in escrow or file a bond before it can
appeal.218 Given the significant monetary amounts in statutes authoriz-
ing the enforcing agency to set penalties,219 the escrow or bond require-
ment likely discourages frivolous requests for hearings.22
("[t]he order shall become final twenty days after service unless within those twenty days the
alleged violator requests in writing a hearing before the director").
214. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3446(b) (1985) ("[a]ny person may appeal an order of
the director of the division of environment by making a written request to the secretary for a
hearing within 15 days of receipt of such order").
215. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.91(a) (1983) (oil pollution or hazardous sub-
stance penalty "shall become due and payable when the person incurring the penalty receives a
notice in writing from the Environmental Management Commission").
216. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3419(c) (1985), part of the Kansas Solid Waste Management
Act, reads as follows:
No penalty shall be imposed pursuant to this section except upon the written order of
the director of the division of environment to the person who committed the viola-
tion. Such order shall state the violation, the penalty to be imposed and the right of
such person to appeal to the secretary of health and environment. Any such person
may, within thirty (30) days after notification make written request to the secretary
for a hearing thereon.
Id. (emphasis added). While the statute does not say when the penalty is effective, the lan-
guage "to be imposed" may indicate that it becomes effective after the hearing or only after the
time for requesting a hearing has passed.
217. See SMCRA § 518, 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (1982) (escrow requirement).
218. See Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-901(d) (Supp. 1985). The Wyoming statute requires a person
against whom a penalty is assessed to pay the proposed penalty in full or petition the council
for review of the penalty. If the aggrieved individual files a petition, he or she must submit a
bond or, if the bond is not approved, the proposed amount of the assessment which will be
placed in escrow. Id. See also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 691.605(b)(1) (Purdon Supp.
1985). These types of provisions, while unusual in hazardous waste, and air or water pollution
statutes, are common in surface mining laws administered by state agencies. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 27.21.250(b) (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 49-405c(c) (1983); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 131.2663(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
219. See supra notes 42-49.
220. Whether this type of requirement is a useful enforcement tool outside the strip mining
context has not been extensively analyzed. Some have suggested that the process may signifi-
cantly enhance the enforcement ability of the agency, particularly if, upon review, the agency
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2. Agency hearing procedures
As with the statutory requirements for notice,221 the state statutes
vary widely in specifying procedures that the agency must follow at a
hearing on a penalty assessment. Some statutes are quite explicit in es-
tablishing procedures that the agency must use. In other states, the agen-
cies have complete discretion-subject to due process constraints2 22 -in
formulating their procedures.
At one extreme, the legislation may be entirely silent on the subject.
The South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Act merely states
that the Department of Health and Environmental Control "may...
invoke civil penalties," and that a violator may appeal the Department's
decision in court.223 The Department is left to establish its own rules.224
Some penalty statutes that do specify procedures emphasize that the
hearing is not to take on rigid judicial trappings. The Kansas Hazardous
Waste Act warns that "[n]othing in this act shall require the observance
of formal rules of evidence or pleading at any hearing. ' 225 And a state
act regulating radiation purports to afford even less formality; the re-
spondent may show only in writing why a penalty should not be
imposed.226
Yet, while informality may seem appealing when compared to judi-
cial procedures, it is probably an illusory goal in most civil penalty cases.
The technical nature of environmental laws,227 the significant liabilities
affords some type of deference to the original assessment. See STATE CIVIL PENALTY Au-
THORITIES, supra note 16, at 47.
221. See infra notes 195-204.
222. Due process requires that, before an agency may impose a penalty or otherwise ad-
versely affect individual rights and obligations, the affected individual must be given an oppor-
tunity to present its case. That hearing will require many of the elements of a trial-type
hearing. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970). Many of the recent due process
decisions have focused on the procedures required when the agency hearing occurs after
agency action as opposed to before that action is undertaken. See, e.g., Blackhawk Mining
Co., Inc. v. Andrus, 711 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1983); B & M Coal Corp. v. Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, 699 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hill, 533
F. Supp. 810 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); United States v. Crooksville Coal, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 141
(S.D. Ohio 1982). The issue also has arisen under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). See, e.g., Wagner
Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736 (D. Kan. 1985).
223. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-140A (Law. Co-op. 1976).
224. The Act gives general rulemaking authority to the South Carolina Board of Health
and Environmental Control, the body charged with implementation of the Act, but apparently
no direct rulemaking authority to the Department. See id. § 44-5b-30.
225. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3446(b) (1985).
226. ARK. CODE ANN. § 82-1525(b)(5) (Supp. 1985).
227. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 34 Pa. Commw. 546, 548 n.2,
384 A.2d 273, 275 n.2 (1978) (noting that the issue of treatment given to energy-producing
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at stake,228 due process requirements, 229 and the public interest in envi-
ronmental protection add pressure to formalize the process. Further, if
the agency has adopted a penalty policy to guide its penaaty imposition
actions, it will undboutedly seek to have that policy and its factual find-
ings in penalty cases accorded deference on judicial review. A court will
be more likely to extend that deference if the agency's procedures provide
an extensive opportunity for the alleged violator to present its case before
the agency.
These considerations have led some states to mandate the use of for-
mal processes in state administrative procedure acts at the penalty hear-
ing.2 30 Even if the penalty statute does not invoke a state adminstrative
procedure act, the right to produce evidence and witnesses, and to cross-
examine witnesses may be specified 23 1 in the statute or offered by the
agency without statutory compulsion.232
C. Deciding on a Penalty Amount
1. The decisionmaking authority
If the penalty is to be assessed administratively, a decisionmaker
must be named. The statute normally will place authority for deciding
public utilities for technologically unavoidable air pollution "will in all likelihood become one
of the most complex issues of contemporary environmental law"), rev'd, 490 Pa. 399, 416 A.2d
995 (1980). The Pennsylvania Power case involved an appeal by Pennsylvania Power Company
from an assessment of civil penalties by the Pennsylvania Hearing Board. Id.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 42-49.
229. Before an agency may impose a penalty, due process of course affords the respondent a
chance to be heard. The amount of process required will vary depending on the situation.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)
("[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands."). Where the liabilities are substantial in an agency-imposed civil penalty, the re-
spondent must be accorded significant procedural protections. See Diver, supra note 79, at
1487. "Even where statutes do not unambiguously require an evidentiary hearing at some
stage, due process requires that a full-scale trial-type hearing be provided before a civil penalty
can be exacted." Id.
230. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-246(b) (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-8-306(5)(b)
(1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-22(e) (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-13-714 (Supp.
1985); WYO. STAT. § 35-11-901(f) (Supp. 1985).
231. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-1709 (McKinney 1984).
232. Under recent statutory amendments authorizing it to assess civil penalties, the Califor-
nia Regional Water Quality Control Board has adopted a policy of informing alleged violators
of their right to appear and be heard, either acting for themselves or through a representative.
At the hearing, although formal rules of evidence are not followed, the Board accepts any
evidence which is reasonable and relevant to the issues. See, e.g., Agenda Item No. Six, Joe De
Mello Dairy-Failure to Submit Annual Self-Monitoring Report, Reporter's Transcript of Pro-
ceedings, Cal. Reg. Water Quality Cont. Bd., Santa Ana Region, at 4 (Apr. 12, 1985). Cross-
examination of witnesses is also allowed, followed by a summation statement by the parties.
Id.
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whether a penalty is appropriate and, if so, its amount in the hands of a
technocratic agency, board or commission, or an official heading an ad-
ministrative body.23 3 Colorado's water quality law is typical; the Execu-
tive Director of the Department of Health or that person's designee
determines the penalty.234 Other statutes call for the department charged
with administering the law to make the assessment, 235 often allowing a
hearing officer to propose a decision.236
If the legislative body opts for administrative assessment of penal-
ties, it also could set up an administrative appeal from the initial agency
decision. California's water pollution laws have a fully developed appeal
system. Regional water quality control boards render the initial penalty
decision after an adjudicatory hearing.237 Within thirty days after the
regional board decides, an aggrieved party may petition the State Water
Resources Control Board for review of that regional board decision.238
The state Board has discretion whether to grant review; however, if it
does decide to hear the matter, the statute authorizes what amounts to de
novo review.23 9 After considering the record before the regional board
and any other relevant evidence, the state Board may "affirm, modify, or
set aside, in whole or in part" the regional board order.24
These types of administrative assessment provisions have two pri-
mary benefits that are superior to judicial assessment statutes. First,
placing the authority in the administrative body promotes a consistency
in penalty application that is impossible at the judicial level. Because the
administrative authority imposing the penalty is the sole adjudicatory
body, it can treat similar violations in a uniform manner. In contrast,
penalty cases filed in court are likely to be heard by different judges, par-
ticularly in populous states. Consequently, achieving consistent results
in those cases is doubtful.
Second, allowing the agency to impose the penalty accords with the
233. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-25-116(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1985) (technical secretary
issues air pollution assessment).
234. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-608(2) (1982).
235. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-266(b)(1) (Supp. 1985).
236. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-81(b) (1982) (Director of Environmental Protection Division
may cause a hearing to be conducted by a hearing officer appointed by the Board of Natural
Resources).
237. CAL. WATER CODE § 13323(e) (West Supp. 1986).
238. Id. § 13324(a). The state Board also may grant review on its own motion. Id.
239. Id. § 13324(b).
240. Id. § 13324(c). This review system makes an important contribution to consistent ad-
ministrative decisionmaking on penalty matters in California. Without review by a California
agency with statewide authority, the specter of conflicting decisions by regional boards in vari-
ous areas of the state is a real one.
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reason why the agency was authorized to regulate the particular environ-
mental area in the first place-its expertise in the subject matter. Even if
explicit penalty criteria will guide the penalty decision, using those crite-
ria may present difficult technical questions. For example, the authority
imposing the penalty may have to determine the seriousness of the viola-
tion or the harm caused in order to decide on an appropriate penalty
amount. An environmental enforcement agency, which can draw on
staff expertise, is better suited than a court to address those issues.
2. Mandatory or discretionary penalties
One interesting question is whether the decisionmaking body must
assess a penalty if it finds a violation. The statutes generally fall into two
categories, those using mandatory language and those containing word-
ing that is directory. The first group of statutes has language that seems
to require a penalty. Under those enactments, the violator "shall pay an
administrative fine levied by the commission," 24' the penalty is "to be
assessed and levied" by the body242 or the violator "shall incur" a pen-
alty.243 In the second group, an official "may invoke" 2' or "may as-
sess'245 a penalty, or is "authorized" to assess the penalty.246
Statutory language can clearly intend a difference between
mandatory and discretionary assessment powers. For example, one part
of a statute could declare that the agency "shall" impose a penalty under
specified circumstances, while another part of the same statute provides
that the agency "may" impose a penalty under other circumstances.247
The difference in language emphasizes the legislative intent that penalties
241. NEV. REV. STAT. § 445.6011 (1979).
242. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-17-29(1) (Supp. 1985).
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.91(a) (1983).
244. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-140A (Law. Co-op. 1976).
245. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7110.308(e) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
246. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58-10A-10d (West Supp. 1985).
247. For example, a Louisiana penalty statute declares that a person "may be liable for a
civil penalty" for specified violations, but that a person "shall be liable for a civil penalty" if
the person fails to take corrective action in a timely manner after being served with a compli-
ance order or cease and desist order. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:1073E(l)-(2) (West Supp.
1986). Similarly, Department of the Interior regulations under the federal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act make assessment of a penalty discretionary for certain viola-
tions, but mandatory for violating a cessation order. See 30 C.F.R. § 723.12 (1985). This
regulation provides:
(a) The Office [of Surface Mining] shall assess a penalty for each cessation order.
(b) The Office shall assess a penalty for each notice of violation if the violation is
assigned 31 points or more under the point system ....
(c) The Office may assess a penalty for each notice of violation assigned 30 points or
less under the point system ....
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in some instances are mandatory. However, absent similar statutory
wording that makes the legislative intent for mandatory penalties obvi-
ous, whether a statute may be interpreted to require a penalty will de-
pend on the case law in the particular state.
In any event, because of other statutory provisions that affect pen-
alty assessment, the question whether the language is mandatory has less
practical significance than might be apparent at first glance. As dis-
cussed above, many state statutes give the agency express authority to
mitigate or remit penalties.2 8 Indeed, in one statute the mitigation au-
thority is included in the very same paragraph that seems to make issu-
ance of the penalty mandatory.249 A broad legislative grant of authority
like this allowing an agency to remit or mitigate penalties casts doubt on
whether the agency must issue a penalty in a particular case. Addition-
ally, the civil penalty statutes usually authorize the agency to assess a
penalty within very broad dollar limits, 250 even if the statute makes a
penalty mandatory. The agency could choose to assess a de minimis pen-
alty-which would effectively make the penalty discretionary in its
impact.
Finally, if the statute is mandatory but the agency nonetheless re-
fuses to assess a penalty in a particular case, that decision is unlikely to
be challenged. The alleged violator would accept the decision, and the
only other check on the agency's refusal to assess would be political pres-
sure. However, that pressure almost surely will not arise, since the pub-
lic is only rarely involved in civil penalty proceedings.25 l
Thus, for a variety of reasons, even if issuance of a penalty was
deemed mandatory under the statute, that provision is unlikely to have
much practical effect.
3. Findings and reasons
From the standpoint of ensuring consistent agency decisions in as-
sessing penalties, the most important procedural protection in the deci-
248. See infra notes 143-44.
249. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.91(a) (1983). This statute, after stating that a violator
"shall incur" a penalty, gives the Environmental Management Commission authority to miti-
gate or remit a penalty in broad language: "The Environmental Management Commission
may... when deemed in the best interest of the State in carrying out the purposes of this
Article, remit or mitigate any penalty provided for in this section. .. ." Id.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
251. But see LA. REv. STAT. § 30:1073E(5) (West 1986) (providing that after submission of
a penalty for determination at a hearing, opportunity for public comment on the penalty must
be provided). At the federal level, EPA regulations provide that state programs certified under
federal legislation, such as the Clean Water Act, must provide for public comment on pro-
posed settlements of court litigation. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(d)(2)(iii) (1985).
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sionmaking process is whether the agency explains its reasoning. Since
many state civil penalty statutes contain no criteria to guide the assess-
ment of penalties, and others setting out criteria do not indicate how to
balance them, a statement of reasons will explain what penalty factors
the agency thought determinative. Further, the statement can provide a
precedential basis for later penalty decisions,2 2 even if the nature of envi-
ronmental penalties renders the precedent less useful than it would be in
other adjudicatory systems of justice. 2 "
Despite the usefulness of a fully developed statement of reasons,
state penalty statutes do not unduly encourage them. In many instances
the statutes are silent, declaring only that the penalty may be "assessed"
or "imposed," or that the agency is to issue an "order. '254 Of course, if
the agency must follow the formal adjudication procedures of a state ad-
ministrative procedure act, findings are likely to be needed. 255  Some
states require the decisionmaker to make a "finding" of violation" 6 or to
"make appropriate determinations and issue an order in accordance
therewith." '257 Texas has one of the most explicit provisions, mandating
not only findings of fact but "a written decision as to the occurrence of
the violation and the amount of the penalty that is warranted.
'258
But these requirements are limited. Generally, the statutes on their
face provide insufficient stimulus for disclosing the agency's reasoning.
252. See Diver, supra note 79, at 1494. "Preparation and retention of written decisions
enables the agency to build an empirical base from which to generate a body of general stan-
dards." Id.
253. For example, to the extent that the penalty must attempt to quantify environmental
harm from a discharge or take into account the ability to pay of a respondent, the penalty
process perhaps allows for less use of precedent than other systems of case-by-case
adjudication.
254. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-17-29(1) (Supp. 1985) ("such penalty to be assessed and
levied by the commission after a hearing"); MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 2-610.1(a)
(Supp. 1985) ("after a hearing at which a violation is found to exist, the Department may
impose a penalty").
255. See, ag., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-246(b) (1982) ("A hearing officer appointed by the
board after a hearing conducted in accordance with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the 'Georgia Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,' shall determine whether or not any person has violated any provi-
sion . . ."); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 28.067(h) (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("All proceedings
under this subsection are subject to the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act
256. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d(b) (1985).
257. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-17097 (McKinney 1984).
258. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 131.2662(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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V. JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES OR REVIEW OF AGENCY
PENALTY ASSESSMENTS
The court's role in the penalty process varies substantially depend-
ing on the authority that the penalty statute gives the agency to assess a
penalty. If the agency initially imposes the penalty, the statute may set
forth the scope of review that the court is to follow or remain silent on
that subject, in which case the court must fall back on general adminis-
trative law principles. Normally, if the legislature expressly authorizes
agency assessment of penalties and the agency accords respondent the
full due process right to be heard, courts will review that assessment with
deference to the agency's factual findings and choice of penalty.
At the other extreme, if the agency lacks power to formally assess
penalties, the agency nonetheless will make an initial penalty determina-
tion for purposes of settlement discussions with the alleged violator. If
those settlement discussions fail, the agency will file suit to recover a
penalty, but the court will not defer to the agency's conclusion that a
penalty is warranted. Thus, the judicial role in the assessment process
turns on the particular civil penalty statute under which the agency oper-
ates and on the hearing that the agency has accorded to the respondent.
A. Agency Procedures for Judicially Imposed Penalties
When the court assesses the penalty,2 9 as opposed to reviewing an
agency-imposed assessment, the procedures it employs are straightfor-
ward. State penalty statutes may affect certain aspects of the case by
altering the burden of proof,260 specifying venue, 61 or expressly estab-
lishing a right to trial by jury. 62 Other than this kind of minor tinker-
ing, however, the penalty statutes usually contain nothing that is
procedurally inventive. The action will be tried in the same manner as
259. For examples of cases where the agency files initially in court seeking civil penalties,
see People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 544 P.2d 1322, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122
(1976) (penalty for sewage discharge); State ex rel. Brown v. Dayton Malleable, 1 Ohio St. 3d
151, 438 N.E.2d 120 (1982) (civil penalty for violation of National Pollution Discharge Elimi-
nation System permit); State ex rel. Brown v. Howard, 3 Ohio App. 3d 189, 444 N.E.2d 469
(1981) (penalties for alleged illegal disposal of solid waste); State ex rel. Pollution Control
Coordinating Bd. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 532 P.2d 1386 (Okla. 1975) (penalties for discharge
into creek).
260. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-13-18(1) (1984) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt).
261. See, e.g., TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 § 9(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (establishing venue
requirements for hazardous waste actions).
262. See, eg., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-1-39 (1977) ("An action for the recovery
of a civil penalty shall, upon demand, be tried to a jury.").
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other civil litigation.2 63
In most states, the state attorney general files the action at the re-
quest of the state agency involved.216 As a practical matter, this relation-
ship between the agency and the attorney general means that the latter
often undertakes an independent review of whether to bring the ac-
tion,26 5 unless the statute mandates him or her to initiate litigation.266
The attorney general also exercises considerable control over how the
litigation is managed, a mixed blessing from a regulatory perspective.
On the positive side, the attorney general's oversight has a salutary
effect on the penalty process. Given the significant penalty amounts that
often are involved, agency arbitrariness in seeking penalties where they
are unwarranted will have significant economic repercussions. Even if
the court refuses to assess a penalty,2 67 litigation defense costs for all
parties can be substantial. The attorney general's oversight authority
thus provides a useful second opinion on the agency's decision to seek the
penalty. Centralizing the state's litigation in the attorney general's office
also greatly reduces the likelihood that various state regulatory agencies
will assume inconsistent positions in litigation, a real possibility if they
are represented by their own counsel.
However, significant drawbacks to this arrangement exist. Friction
between the attorney general's office and the agency staff can impact the
agency's attainment of consistent penalty enforcement policy.268 The at-
263. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 6111.09 (Page Supp. 1984) (declaring that the civil
penalty action "is a civil action, governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure and other rules of
practice and procedure applicable to civil actions").
264. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2825.01 (1984) ("The attorney general may bring a civil
or criminal action to enforce the [hazardous waste] provisions. . . ."). In some instances the
state statute authorizes additional public officials to bring the action as well. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42403 (West 1979) ("The civil penalties [for air pollution viola-
tions] shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the
State of California by the Attorney General, by any district attorney, or by the attorney for any
district in which the violation occurs . . ").
265. North Dakota air pollution legislation emphasizes that the choice of whether to bring
the action is the attorney general's, not the agency's. The department of health is to "make all
of its evidence and findings available to the attorney general for use in any remedial action his
office deems to be appropriate." N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-25-10 (1978).
266. Some statutory language seems to require the attorney general to act. See, e.g., VA.
CODE § 32.1-186A (1984) (all civil penalties "shall be recovered in a civil action brought by
the Attorney General in the name of the Commonwealth"). Whether language like this actu-
ally constitutes a legal mandate that the attorney general must bring all actions is a question of
state constitutional and statutory law. In any event, attorneys general are normally elected
officials, and their offices will exercise considerable control in coordinating state litigation even
if the statute seems to be mandatory.
267. See, e.g., People v. Mobil Oil Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 261, 192 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1983)
(affirming trial court's dismissal of civil penalty complaint at close of plaintiffs case).
268. The same friction, of course, often has been the subject of discussion with respect to
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torney general will have considerable input into any settlement agree-
ments269 and may disagree with the agency's viewpoint on the worth of
the case. If the agency has adopted a penalty policy, that disagreement
may affect the implementation of the policy.
Most important, however, is the prospect of substantial delay when
-the agency refers the case to the attorney general to institute litigation.
Inevitably, coordinating the case between two bureaucratic offices is not
a simple task. Since one purpose of a civil penalty is to achieve swift
deterrence, the delay undermines the penalty function. This reason alone
provides support for allowing the agency to assess the penalty adminis-
tratively, with the attorney general representing the agency in court if the
violator challenges the assessment.
B. Judicial Review of Agency Penalty Assessments
If the agency has assessed the penalty in the first instance, judicial
review will be available.270 However, state statutes often do not clearly
address either the scope of judicial review or the mechanics for review of
agency assessments, a situation also common at the federal level.271 In
the absence of explicit guidance, state courts will review the case under
principles established by state administrative procedure acts or similar
state laws governing review of administrative agency decisionmaking.272
If a statute does address judicial review, the parties will be most con-
cerned with two factors: limitations on the availability of review and the
scope of judicial inquiry into the agency's decision.
Statutory limitations on how a party may seek review of a penalty
federal enforcement. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1983: Hearings on
S. 7S7Before the Subcomm. on EnvtL Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1983) (statements of Carol Dinkens, Ass't Att'y Gen., Land & Nat.
Resources Division, Dep't of Justice, and Sen. Chafee).
269. Some statutes are explicit on this point. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4.1(I)
(West Supp. 1986) (assistant secretary with concurrence of attorney general may settle suits for
penalty); N.Y. ENVTIL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-17074 (McKinney 1984) (civil penalty may be
released or compromised by commissioner before the matter has been referred to attorney
general; where matter has already been referred, attorney general may release or compromise
any penalty or discontinue any action with consent of commissioner).
270. If the agency has no statutory authority to assess the penalty, then any action taken by
the agency prior to initiating litigation will have no more effect than any other pre-litigation
settlement discussions.
271. See Schmeltzer & Kitzes, supra note 14, at 864 ("The majority of [federal] civil penalty
statutes contain no clear indication of congressional intent concerning review procedures.").
272. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1158
(La. 1984) (although state's Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was inapplicable to review
of decisions under Environmental Affairs Act, standards in the APA apply by analogy).
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decision are not usually significant.273 Most state review statutes require
that the aggrieved party request review within a limited period or waive
rights to attack the penalty. Under those statutes, if a party does not
seek judicial review of a penalty assessment order within the allotted
time, the validity of that order probably cannot be contested in a later
action by the agency to collect the penalty.27a Also, in rare instances a
statute will require the appellant to post a bond. 75
The parties' primary concern will be the scope of review. The party
seeking review of the penalty assessment would prefer de novo review,276
including the right to present additional evidence, while the agency will
argue that its penalty assessment should receive judicial deference
through a standard of limited review. Often the statutes are vague about
the standard the court is to apply,177 leaving fertile ground for litigation.
Statutes in many instances contain language traditionally found in
administrative procedure acts that refers to the "substantial evidence"
standard of judicial review.278 For example, the Pennsylvania Admin-
strative Agency Law establishes the scope of review of Environmental
Hearing Board decisions in Pennsylvania.279 Under that law, the Board's
penalty decision will be upheld unless the adjudication violates appel-
lant's constitutional or statutory rights, or a finding of fact "made by the
273. A Texas statute contains an interesting provision that apparently is intended to require
aggrieved parties to specify the ground on which they seek review. The statute declares that a
party may seek judicial review of "either the amount of the penalty or the fact of the violation
or of both the fact of the violation and the amount of the penalty." TEx. CODE ANN. art.
4477-5 § 4.0410)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
274. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 § 1041(c) (West Supp. 1985) (no challenge to validity
of order by Illinois Pollution Control Board may be made in an enforcement proceeding if
party could have raised that issue in a timely petition for review of order under provisions of
this section).
275. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-17-29(1) (Supp. 1985) (Mississippi Solid Waste Act re-
quires appellant desiring to stay execution of civil penalty to post a bond "in an amount equal
to double the amount of any civil penalty assessed by the commission"); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 49-17-43(a) (Supp. 1985) (same).
276. Montana expressly accords de novo review in pesticide cases. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 80-8-306(6) (1985) (appeal to district court by trial de novo, with jury trial granted if
requested).
277. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-170d(d) (1985) (authorizing any aggrieved party to apply
to district court within 30 days for review of order or decision; statute does not expressly
establish standard of review).
278. Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the agency's decision is upheld if
supported by "substantial evidence." Substantial evidence is "'more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
279. A.H. Grove & Sons v. Commonwealth, 70 Pa. Commw. 34, 34, 452 A.2d 586, 587
(1982).
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agency and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence."28 Other standards of review established in state pen-
alty statutes accord similar deference to the agency's fact-finding and
penalty powers. In Illinois the agency decision may be found invalid
only if it is "against the manifest weight of the evidence. '281 An Ala-
bama court must sustain the agency's finding of a violation and assess-
ment of a civil penalty if those actions are "supported by fair
preponderance of the evidence." '282
These standards of review obviously place a heavy burden on a party
challenging the agency assessment. If the agency has decided confficting
factual assertions after a hearing, a court is likely to affirm that decision
under a substantial evidence-type review.283 Further, although courts
could construe even these types of statutes as limiting the scope of the
agency's discretion in setting the penalty, 284 courts normally will respect
280. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See also TEx. WATER CODE
ANN. § 28.067(1) (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("Judicial review of the order or decision of the com-
mission assessing the penalty shall be under the substantial evidence rule .... .
281. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 § 1041(b) (West Supp. 1985).
282. ALA. CODE ANN. § 22-30-19(f) (1984).
283. For a recent example of how the substantial evidence standard of review is applied to
an environmental penalty assessment, see Yalfe Iron & Metal Co. v. EPA, 774 F.2d 1008 (10th
Cir. 1985). In reviewing a decision to impose penalties under the federal Toxic Substances
Control Act, the court of appeals observed: "ITmhe possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not mean that they are not supported by substantial evi-
dence. The agency's findings as to facts . . . must be accorded due deference . Id. at
1014.
284. For example, a long line of cases under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
carefully scrutinizes penalty assessments by the Illinois Pollution Control Board. The first
case placing a judicial gloss on § 1041, the review provision of the Illinois Act, was City of
Monmouth v. Pollution Control Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 482, 313 N.E.2d 161 (1974). The court re-
versed the Board's imposition of a civil penalty because the record indicated that the city had
cooperated with the agency and that technological means of abating the pollution at issue did
not exist. The court relied on the legislative declaration of purpose in the Illinois Environmen-
tal Protection Act to conclude that the principal reason for imposing civil penalties must be to
aid in the enforcement of the Act. Id. at 490, 313 N.E.2d at 166. Applying this legislative
purpose to the record, the court concluded that the Board erred in imposing the penalty. Id.
The court relied on its reasoning in City of Monmouth to overturn the agency's assessment
of civil penalties in Southern Ill. Asphalt Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 60 Ill. 2d 204, 326
N.E.2d 406 (1975). While the court did not find that the agency had not considered the statu-
tory criteria, it concluded that because the record "contains substantial evidence. . . which
indicates that the imposition of the penalty would not aid the enforcement of the Act," the
Board had erred in imposing the penalties. Id. at 209, 326 N.E.2d at 409. Later cases also
addressing the Board's penalty discretion include: Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Bd., 60
Ill. 2d 330, 328 N.E.2d 5 (1975) (upholding a $3500 civil penalty); City of East Moline v.
Pollution Control Bd., 136 Ill. App. 3d 687, 483 N.E.2d 642 (1985) (affirming a modified
$10,000 penalty); Wasteland, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 118 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 456 N.E.2d
964 (1983) (upholding a $75,000 civil penalty against a solid waste landfill operator violating
its permit and ignoring abatement orders); Harris-Hub Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 50 Ill.
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the agency's penalty choice.285
On balance, therefore, these statutes discourage casual litigation
over penalty assessments, since a party seeking review of a penalty deter-
mination faces an uphill battle to succeed. The result strengthens the
agency's enforcement hand, because its penalty decisions are less likely to
be overturned.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PENALTY STATUTES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
The statutes discussed in this Article strongly influence state en-
forcement of environmental laws. They authorize a civil penalty, set
forth criteria for determining the amount of the penalty and establish the
procedural rules for the penalty process. Most importantly, they also
designate a court or agency to impose the penalty.
Based on the analysis above, the remainder of this Article draws
several conclusions about the implications of the state civil penalty stat-
utes. Some caution is necessary, because the statutes are not the only
influence on state environmental enforcement through imposition of civil
penalties. Definitive conclusions about the efficacy of the enforcement
framework can be drawn only after analyzing the bureaucratic organiza-
tion of state enforcement agencies, informal practices and procedures
used by the agencies, including any settlement policies, 2 6 and the actual
penalty decisions made in specific cases. Analysis of these factors is not a
part of this Article. Nonetheless, the statutes themselves clearly have
noticeable effects on environmental enforcement.
App. 3d 608, 365 N.E.2d 1071 (1977) (vacating a $500 civil penalty for failure to obtain a
permit).
Detailed analysis of judicial decisions such as these that impose or review penalty assess-
ments is beyond the scope of this Article. However, this brief summary of the Illinois cases
indicates that, despite a statute embodying a limited scope of review, courts can closely scruti-
nize agency penalty decisions for consistency with statutory purposes.
285. Courts may view penalty assessments on judicial review differently than the underlying
factual determinations they rest upon. See, e.g., Panhandle Coop. Ass'n v. EPA, 771 F.2d
1149, 1151 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming penalty imposed by EPA under Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)). The court noted that if substantial
evidence supports an order, the court must uphold it. Id. at 1151-52. However, the court
observed that "the assessment [of a penalty] is not a factual finding but the exercise of a discre-
tionary grant of power." Id. at 1152.
286. Some states have adopted informal, written penalty policies not found in adopted
rules; others have unwritten procedures for settling cases. See STATE CIVIL PENALTY Au-
THORITIES, supra note 16, at 70-93. The policies listed in many instances are only very infor-
mal guidelines, sometimes merely repeating statutory phrases.
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A. The Prevalence of Settlements
Two characteristics of the state penalty statutes are particularly im-
portant in encouraging the enforcing agency and the alleged violator to
settle the case when the agency seeks penalties. The first characteristic is
the inordinately large amount of charging discretion that the penalty
statutes place in the agency. With possible penalties commonly set at
$25,000 per violation and separate penalties allowed for each day of vio-
lation,28 7 the mere availability of these penalties gives agencies significant
bargaining leverage. For the smallest violation, the statutes authorize a
potential liability that must concern even large corporate violators.
A second feature of the statutory structure is its failure to allow
parties to predict monetary outcomes of penalty cases. Many statutes
contain no criteria for the court or agency to use in imposing a penalty,
and those that do often have standards which are not helpful. While
penalty criteria cannot by themselves supply complete or even substantial
predictability to penalty cases, they at least can give responding parties a
sense of the important factors that are relevant in a penalty assessment.
Where a statute does not set forth with any precision the factors that the
court or agency is to consider, the result is a penalty process that lacks
sufficient structure.
In short, these features of the penalty statutes inject a large measure
of uncertainty into environmental enforcement proceedings. This uncer-
tainty largely explains one of the most striking aspects of state environ-
mental enforcement law: the small number of appellate cases addressing
penalty imposition. The resources poured into state environmental law
enforcement over the last fifteen years lead one to expect that some small
but significant percentage of civil penalty enforcement cases would result
in appellate decisions. That thesis has not proved true.288 Instead, the
287. See supra text accompanying note 41.
288. The annotations under state civil penalty statutes indicate that few civil penalty cases
have reached the appellate stage. For example, Article 71 of New York's Environmental Con-
versation Law contains a series of statutes authorizing civil penalties as a means of enforcing
environmental laws. See, eg., N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-0507, 71-1127, 71-1929,
71-1941, 71-2103, 71-2113, 71-2303, 71-2503, 71-2703, 71-2705, 71-2907, 71-3103, 71-3703,
71-3803, 71-3903, 71-3905, 71-4003, 71-4103 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1986). The annota-
tions under these statutes list only nine cases decided since 1970. Similarly, California has
some of the most sophisticated environmental laws in the United States. See C. DUERKSEN,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL PLANT SITING 218-29 app. A (1983) (rank-
ing California as having the second strictest set of environmental standards in the country).
Yet the annotation to the principal water pollution enforcement statute authorizing civil penal-
ties, Water Code § 13350, lists only three reported cases decided since 1970. CAL. WATER
CODE § 13350 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986). The principal air pollution enforcement statutes,
Health and Safety Code §§ 42403 and 43016, have spawned only one reported case since their
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parties settle almost all cases, a result that the structure of the penalty
statutes encourages.289
The statutory uncertainty over important legal questions affects the
enforcing agency and the responding party. Both may view an adverse
court decision as so potentially disruptive that they determine to avoid
this possibility. From the agency's perspective, it will be concerned that
an adverse precedent in a reported decision will cripple its entire enforce-
ment efforts, perhaps requiring legislative intervention in order to reverse
the decision. For example, an appellate court might affirm a trial court's
refusal to assess penalties despite its finding of a statutory violation,
thereby casting doubt over what the agency previously had thought were
routine enforcement actions.29 ' A decision like this also would have the
effect of devaluing the maximum penalty in the statute, since in the fu-
ture violators might not take its threat as seriously. Alternatively, an
appellate decision might increase the agency's already considerable en-
forcement capability by resolving uncertainty in the statutory scheme ad-
versely to the defendant.291 In a particular case, that decision could
respective enactments in 1975 and 1976. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42403, 43016
(West 1979 & Supp. 1986).
Other states, particularly those that have authorized administrative assessment of civil
penalties for a long period of time, have more reported decisions. Illinois, for example, lists 29
reported cases under the civil penalty enforcement provision of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 § 1042 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985). Nonetheless,
the annotations of state penalty statutes reveal that very few of the enforcement cases brought
reach the appellate level. Since enforcement agencies clearly have been active at the state level
during this period, the conclusion is inescapable that almost all the cases settle.
For informal confirmation of this conclusion, see Olner, Polluters Settling for the 'Letter'
of the Law, L.A. Times, July 6, 1984, pt. II, at 1, col. 1. The article discusses the program for
settling air pollution cases instituted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District, the
air pollution enforcement agency for the Los Angeles metropolitan area.
In addressing the District's switch from criminal to civil enforcement, the article states:
Before the out-of-court settlement program was established, 95% of the pollution
cases were sent to criminal court. Now a mere 5% wind up there. The remaining
10% of the violators are routed to civil court, although the district's five lawyers and
seven investigators have never yet had to take one to trial. They always settle.
Id.
289. Federal environmental agencies also settle most penalty cases. See Comment, supra
note 13, at 462 n.186 ("The EPA currently settles the vast majority of civil penalty cases for
substantially less than the statutorily permitted maximum.").
290. See State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Church, 664 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), in which
the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's refusal to impose civil penalties for
admitted violations of the state Clean Water Law. A decision like this would have ramifica-
tions beyond the parties to the litigation itself; it could seriously weaken the agency's bargain-
ing position in subsequent settlement negotiations.
291. For example, in State v. City & County of San Francisco, 94 Cal. App. 3d 522, 156
Cal. Rptr. 542 (1979), the court construed a civil penalty provision to place the burden on the
violator to demonstrate that the pollution damage was such that the penalty should be less
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prove very costly to the violator.
Additional reasons peculiar to the agency and the respondent rein-
force this tendency toward settlement. Agencies accept settlements be-
cause they maximize use of the limited bureaucratic resources available
to them,2 92 and perhaps because they may wish to avoid referring the
matter to a state prosecutor, with the attendant delay and loss of control
involved. Alleged violators, on the other hand, may prefer settlement to
avoid publicity2 93 or to secure favorable tax treatment.294
Bargained settlements, of course, are not to be discouraged. They
can constitute an efficient way of using an agency's limited enforcement
resources. The prevalence of settlement, however, does raise at least a
question about the effect of the state penalty statutes. The lack of criteria
for courts or agencies to use in setting penalties means that, in reaching a
settlement, the agency has few standards to guide it. The possibility ex-
ists that settlements are too low to fully deter violators, or that agencies'
settlements are not consistent.
Agency settlements always will require the exercise of a large
amount of discretion. But greater precision in statutory penalty criteria
and more structure in agency rules or policies concerning penalties
would improve the settlement process by increasing its consistency.
295
B. Agency or Court Assessments?
A trend has emerged over almost the last two decades toward
than the maximum provided for in the statute. Because environmental damages are difficult to
quantify, that burden could be substantial.
292. At the federal level, agencies investigate and prosecute only a small percentage of vio-
lations. See Diver, supra note 35, at 351 ("Most agencies concede that they investigate and
prosecute only a fraction of all the violations that occur. The 'technology' of detection and
investigation imposes relatively inflexible limits on the caseload they can generate."). There is
little reason to believe that state agency enforcement is any different.
293. State agencies and attorneys general routinely issue press releases when filing actions
against polluters. Even though settlement discussions will likely focus on amounts far lower
than the maximum authorized by statute, when an agency cannot settle the case, the complaint
usually will seek the maximum penalty authorized by statute. The attendant publicity gener-
ated by that total figure often receives substantial press coverage. See, eg., Rainey, $30,050 in
Fines Urged for City in Sewer Spills, L.A. Times, Aug. 9, 1985, pt. II, at 1, col. I (discussing
proposed civil penalty against City of Los Angeles for sewage spill).
294. A penalty is not deductible if it is intended to punish. 26 U.S.C. § 162() (1982). But
see True v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 1370, 1374 (D. Wyo. 1985) (holding a penalty under
the Clean Water Act to be deductible).
295. Legislatures also could stress the importance of uniform and consistent decisionmak-
ing in statutory statements of legislative intent, thereby emphasizing the importance of consis-
tency in penalty assessments and settlements. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:1073(A)(2)
(West Supp. 1986) ("Violations shall be addressed in a formal and consistent manner in ac-
cordance with consistent procedures .... ").
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agency rather than court-assessed civil penalties.296 The Administrative
Conference of the United States encouraged this practice in 1972 when it
recommended increased use of civil monetary sanctions, asserting that
the benefits of civil penalties could best be achieved through an adminis-
trative imposition system.297 A 1979 report submitted to the Adminis-
trative Conference noted that the number of administratively imposed
penalties at the federal level had grown.298 The state civil penalty statutes
mirror this trend; increasingly, those statutes authorize state agencies to
assess civil penalties as a means of enforcing environmental laws.299 The
trend is particularly notable in the hazardous waste field, which has been
the subject of substantial legislative efforts in recent years. 3"
Federal environmental statutes authorize both judicial and adminis-
trative assessment of penalties. Interestingly, however, little indication
exists that Congress paid much attention to the choice between these two
methods,310 even though agency assessment enhances environmental en-
296. The beginning of the trend was the passage of the federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969 (CMHSA), Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§§ 801-962 (1971 & Supp. 1985)). The Act contained a section authorizing the Secretary of
the Interior to impose civil penalties administratively. CMHSA § 109, 30 U.S.C. § 819. This
act was followed quickly by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which also au-
thorized agency-imposed civil penalties. Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 17, 84 Stat. 1590, 1606-07
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1985)).
297. See Goldschmid, supra note 14, at 896-902.
298. Diver, supra note 35, at 205.
299. See, eg., CAL. WATER CODE § 13350(0(1) (West Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 2012.1 (West Supp. 1985).
300. For example, since 1976 the following states have authorized administrative agencies
to assess penalties in enforcing hazardous waste laws: Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-
4213(b) (Supp. 1985)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6309(a)(2) (1983)); Georgia (GA.
CODE ANN. 12-8-81(b) (1981)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 39-4413 (1985)); Maryland (MD.
HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE § 2-610.1 (Supp. 1985)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-417
(1984)); Nevada (NEv. REv. STAT. § 444.740 (1981)); New York (N.Y. ENVTI. CONSERV.
LAW § 71-2705 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1986)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-
22 (Supp. 1985)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-2012.1 (West Supp. 1985)); Penn-
sylvania (35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6018.605 (Purdon Supp. 1985)); Rhode Island (R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-19.1.17 (1985)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-215 (Supp. 1985));
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105.080 (Supp. 1986)). However, see supra text
accompanying notes 178-82 for a discussion of the uncertainty in the Montana, Nevada and
Rhode Island laws.
301. With the exception of noncompliance penalties for major stationary sources under
Clean Air Act § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1982), the legislative history of federal environmental
laws provides little indication of congressional reasons for choosing between courts and agen-
cies. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) expressly provides for agency
assessments of civil penalties after opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing. TSCA § 16(a), 15
U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1982). The legislative history of TSCA indicates that both the Senate and
House versions of the bill provided for administrative assessment, but no explanation for the
choice appears. H.R. REP. No. 1679, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 92-93, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4539, 4577-78. Similarly, the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanc-
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forcement in several important ways. First, it allows the agency to act
swiftly, an important enforcement objective that is often given insuffi-
cient weight. 302 Agency assessment avoids the long delays necessarily as-
sociated with seeking judicial relief; the agency can set the matter for
hearing in a matter of weeks, thus forcing alleged violators to decide
quickly how they will respond. Second, agency assessment maximizes
use of bureaucratic resources, since agency decisionmakers with expertise
in the field will consider the often technical facts that can arise in the
enforcement proceeding. For example, if the violation concerns a break-
down in air pollution control equipment, the appropriateness of a penalty
in that situation may depend on understanding the characteristics and
reliability of complex air pollution technology. An agency can be ex-
pected to have knowledge on this subject, while the parties in a judicial
proceeding would have to educate a court about it.
30 3
Administrative assessment also permits agencies to handle minor
enforcement problems efficiently. If a monitoring report is late or a vio-
tuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA) provides for agency assessment of penalties, MPRSA § 105, 33
U.S.C. § 1415 (1986), yet the legislative history gives no indication Congress even considered
whether penalties should be judicially or administratively imposed. See 117 CONG. REC.
31,156 (1971) (clarification of civil penalty provision of House bill).
However, Congress adopted a different approach in enacting the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Section 113 of the Clean Air Act provides for a civir-action to assess penalties for
violations of the Act. CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1982). Section 120, however, authorizes
administrative assessment of certain stationary source noncompliance penalties. CAA § 120,
42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1982).
The legislative history indicates that Congress made a conscious choice to allow adminis-
trative rather than judicial assessment of these noncompliance penalties. See H.R. REP. No.
294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72, 75, 78, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1150-57. In adopting administrative enforcement, Congress expressly recognized the benefits
of such a system: flexibility, no added burden on scarce judicial resources and more effective,
expeditious enforcement. Id. at 78, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1156.
See also Perellis, Noncompliance Penalties Under Section 120 of the Clean Air Act, 16 NAT.
RYs. LAW. 499 (1983-84).
302. EPA's civil penalty policy recognizes swift resolution of environmental problems as an
important goal: "The Agency's primary mission is to protect the environment. As long as an
environmental violation continues, precious natural resources, and possibly public health, are
at risk. For this reason, swift correction of identified environmental problems must be an
important goal of any enforcement action." POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES, supra note 40, at 5.
303. Drayton, Economic Law Enforcement, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 n.2. Drayton, a
former enforcement chief for the State of Connecticut, observed that:
uncertainty [in determining penalties]-especially when combined with the technical
complexities that characterize many environmental cases-encourages judicial pro-
crastination and, more importantly, leads most judges either to defer imposing penal-
ties and/or to order penalties much smaller than the economic benefits the polluter
obtains from delaying or avoiding compliance. These savings are larger than most
judges intuit; their analogies with other cases are often deceiving.
Id. at 1-2 n.2.
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lation occurs but does not result in increased emissions or discharges, a
small penalty determined quickly is an effective means of responding to
the problem, while referral to a court would be excessive. Finally, and
most importantly, the agency is in a far better position than a court to
develop and apply a consistent penalty policy across different cases. Ju-
dicial litigation almost inevitably means a new decisionmaker for each
case, with the attendant inconsistencies in penalty decisions,3°4 while ad-
ministrative assessment avoids this drawback. Agencies can adopt and
apply a consistent penalty policy, while courts cannot assure that
outcome.3 °5
Countervailing arguments do exist to support retaining the court as
the penalty imposition body. For large-scale violators, the full scope of
the violation might be uncovered only after extensive discovery in litiga-
tion, and a court is probably better suited than an agency to supervise
discovery. Bias is another often discussed problem.3 6 Although author-
izing an agency both to initiate the administrative proceeding and to de-
cide its merits does not violate due process, 307 the dual functions sit
uncomfortably on the agency. Additionally, agencies must receive new
bureaucratic resources if they are to exercise the monetary assessment
power.
However, the benefits of allowing the agency to assess the penalty
outweigh the demerits.308 If a particular case will require extensive dis-
304. "One problem that has continually plagued EPA efforts to discourage polluters
through civil penalties is the unevenness of judicially imposed monetary penalties." J. BONINE
& T. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 912 (1984). The authors cite
United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 12 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1417 (W.D. Tenn. 1978), in
which the court imposed only a $30,000 fine for an illegal discharge of toxic chemicals that
lasted for at least 398 days. The fine amounted to less than $100 per day of violation.
305. See Lawrence, supra note 41, at 414 (discussing the weaknesses of the courts' analyti-
cal approach in assessing penalties).
306. Discussion of possible bias was a key consideration in the legislative history of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1969, the act which set the stage for much wider use of
administratively assessed civil penalties at the federal level. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1970). See also Schmeltzer & Kitzes, supra note 14, at 857 (noting that bias and
prejudgment are significant problems, although not grounds for legal reversal).
307. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
308. A recent United States General Accounting Office study of efforts to detect or deter
illegal disposal of hazardous wastes indicates that state enforcement officials concur with this
conclusion. The study observes:
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey environmental agencies do
not have administrative authority to issue civil penalties. In those states, such mat-
ters must be referred to the state attorney general to bring civil suit. However, state
officials believe that administrative penalty authority would expedite enforcement ac-
tion. The Enforcement Program Manager of the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency said that the length of time, often 3 or 4 years, required to litigate cases is a
problem. He believes the time would be much shorter with administrative order
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covery, the statute could give the option to an agency to seek the penalty
either through an administrative assessment or by filing a lawsuit. The
agency could then use the judicial process in instances where it is truly
effective. Possible bias is a commonly alleged problem with all adjudica-
tory agencies; it weighs no greater here than elsewhere. Resources obvi-
ously will be needed, but surely at no more societal cost than if courts
assess the penalty.
On balance, the agency assessment process is superior to judicial
imposition of penalties. It provides swift deterrence that maximizes use
of agency expertise. The recent trend of statutes adopting this idea indi-
cates that state legislatures agree.
C. Structuring the Penalty Decision
The need for standards in agency penalty assessments is unques-
tioned.30 9 They give the primary indication of legislative intent on how
the penalty is to be assessed and prevent an agency from engaging in
penalty efforts that will reach divergent results in similar cases. 1° One
cannot, of course, expect penalty criteria to turn penalty assessments into
an absolutely precise science. Because the standards cover a broad range
of situations not easily foreseen, they must have flexibility. Nonetheless,
many state penalty statutes fall short in this area, giving no guidance or
only minimal guidance to the court or the agency in setting the
penalty.311
Improvements are possible. The statute should clearly specify the
locus of penalty authority in the agency, the court, or both. Further, the
provision for consideration of "any relevant factors" contained in many
authority because it would not necessarily require court proceedings. The Chief of
the Massachusetts Attorney General's Environmental Protection Division, the Chief
of the Toxic Substances Control Division of the California Department of Health
Services, and the Director of New Jersey's Department of Environmental Protection
each made similar statements.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: DIFFICULT
TO DETECT OR DETER 41-42 (1985).
309. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 17, at 333 (criteria needed "[t]o protect against arbi-
trary imposition of the penalty").
310. See Diver, supra note 35, at 253 (concluding with respect to a federal oil spill penalty
program that the variations in data "tend to confirm one's expectation that the largely open-
ended regulatory standards produce widely divergent results in practice").
311. A recent EPA study of enforcement attitudes in five EPA regions and five states con-
cluded that, with the exception of states using EPA's matrix for Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act violations, and one state with a written penalty policy, consensus existed among
the states that their penalty assessment process was generally "subjective." ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, EPA/STATE PERCEPTIONS REGARDING PENALTY PRACTICES AND OVER-
SIGHT OPTIONS, at 4 (1985).
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statutes invites the court or agency to evaluate a variety of criteria that
the violator may not even know about. If the statute is specific, no need
exists for consideration of these "other relevant factors." Agencies can
be directed to use rulemaking powers to further specify how they will
apply the statutory penalty criteria.312 Statutes also should direct agen-
cies to give a complete statement of reasons when issuing any penalty
assessment.313 That statement would indicate the agency's reasoning for
assessing a penalty in a particular situation and would constitute a safe-
guard against inconsistency.
Finally, legislatures should direct agencies to make penalty assess-
ment and settlement data easily available.31 4 If a respondent is assured
that the penalty proposed for a particular violation is not out of line with
other settlements in roughly similar cases, settlement becomes more
likely, saving the agency time and resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
The authorization for state agencies to use civil penalties grew incre-
mentally in the past. Legislators have been more concerned with estab-
lishing the substantive regulatory provisions of environmental laws than
with specifying how they will be enforced. However, if the states in the
future continue to invest state environmental agencies with the ability to
seek substantial civil penalties, legislatures will have to consider the is-
sues discussed in this Article more carefully. They are central to the
success and fairness of a civil penalty imposition process.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 151-55.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 255-61.
314. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7:14, § 8.7 (1984) (requiring Department to make a file of
each assessment that is available for public inspections).
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